by C. Fred Bergsten, Peterson Institute for International Economics
Op-ed in the Financial Times
November 29, 2010
© Financial Times
With policymakers failing to make progress on the critical issue of global imbalances, America has no alternative but to put China on notice. Privately but promptly, Washington has to inform Beijing it will label it as a currency manipulator, back legislation treating the manipulation as an export subsidy, and take it to the World Trade Organization (WTO) if it does not let the renminbi rise significantly.
The renewed increases in the external imbalances of the two main economies pose major risks. China's surplus is again climbing while it tightens monetary policy because of concerns over overheating. It thus maintains its rapid expansion partly at the expense of other countries and dampens global growth. It should instead let its currency rise and limit the cutback in domestic demand. That would help contain inflation and offset the resulting decline in its trade surplus.
US output growth has been cut in half in the past six months by the renewed sharp expansion of its current account deficit. The Federal Reserve's second round of quantitative easing and the likely extension of some form of the Bush tax cuts are efforts to provide offsetting boosts to domestic demand—but they may not succeed.
So, the rebalancing strategy is moving in the wrong direction. The huge US budget deficit and the Fed's easing have replaced the US private sector as "consumer of last resort" and trade is impeding rather than leading the recovery. China's reserve hoard grew faster in the latest quarter than ever before. Its global trade surplus for the past six months is more than 50 percent above last year's. The trade imbalance between the two countries has recently hit record levels.
In the medium run, this pattern will lead to further retreat from open trade and free financial flows. In the longer term, the enlarged imbalances will sow the seeds of renewed crises. The huge capital flows from surplus to deficit countries, Germany to the eurozone periphery as well as China to America, helped create the loose monetary conditions that encouraged the irresponsible lending that brought on the Great Recession.
The most effective way for President Barack Obama to break the impasse is to start adopting a serious strategy for US budget reform as proposed by the cochairs of his Fiscal Commission, who rightly urge an ambitious program of deficit reduction. Only such an initiative will convince other countries the United States is serious about rebalancing its own economy and so persuade them to rebalance theirs. This would regain the moral high ground for America.
The policy conflict with China now plays out on three fronts. The House of Representatives has passed a bill authorizing countervailing import duties against the export subsidies created by undervalued exchange rates such as with China. The Senate needs merely to attach this language to "must" legislation, such as extension of the tax cuts, and it will land on Mr. Obama's desk for almost certain signature. Another response would be to forge a broad coalition to take China to the WTO under its rule that prohibits countries from "taking exchange action that frustrates the intent of the agreement."
A second front is the next Treasury report on foreign exchange practices, delayed from its due date of October 15 pending further evidence of China's exchange rate intentions and the Group of 20 summit. The Seoul outcome was minimal and the average value of the renminbi has weakened since China announced "greater flexibility" in June. So the Treasury must designate China (and a few others) as a manipulator, as Mr. Obama came close to doing publicly after Seoul.
Then there is the visit of Hu Jintao, China's president, to Washington in January—although it is hard to see what they can agree to that they were unable to do at the G-20 summit.
The G-20 stalemate has intensified the feud over currencies and trade rather than helped to resolve it. Mr. Obama has to notify China privately that his administration will designate it as a "manipulator," support new legislation, and take China to the WTO unless it lets the renminbi rise substantially before the Hu visit. The Chinese say they will never move under foreign pressure but have revealed they will do so only under such pressure. The world economy will fare much better under the proposed strategy.
Policy Brief 13-16: Preserving the Open Global Economic System: A Strategic Blueprint for China and the United States June 2013
Working Paper 12-19: The Renminbi Bloc Is Here: Asia Down, Rest of the World to Go?
Revised August 2013
Policy Brief 12-7: Projecting China's Current Account Surplus April 2012
Book: Sustaining China's Economic Growth after the Global Financial Crisis January 2012
Book: Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of China's Economic Dominance September 2011
Op-ed: For a Serious Impact, Tax Chinese Assets in the United States October 13, 2011
Op-ed: Taxing China's Assets: How to Increase US Employment Without Launching a Trade War April 25, 2011
Op-ed: Why the World Needs Three Global Currencies February 15, 2011
Policy Brief 10-26: Currency Wars? November 2010
Testimony: Correcting the Chinese Exchange Rate September 15, 2010
Policy Brief 10-20: Renminbi Undervaluation, China’s Surplus, and the US Trade Deficit August 2010
Op-ed: Chinomics: Yes, China Does Need that Infrastructure June 23, 2010
Policy Brief 10-16: Deepening China-Taiwan Relations through the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement June 2010
Testimony: China's Exchange Rate Policy and Trade Imbalances April 22, 2010
Op-ed: New Imbalances Will Threaten Global Recovery June 10, 2010
Policy Brief 10-7: The Sustainability of China's Recovery from the Global Recession March 2010
Testimony: Correcting the Chinese Exchange Rate: An Action Plan March 24, 2010
Paper: Submission to the USTR in Support of a Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement January 25, 2010
Peterson Perspective: A Growing US-China Rift January 6, 2010
Book: China's Rise: Challenges and Opportunities (hardcover) September 2008
Paper: China Energy: A Guide for the Perplexed May 2007
Speech: Is China a Currency “Manipulator”? January 28, 2009
Testimony: China's Role in the Origins of and Response to the Global Recession February 17, 2009
Book: US-China Trade Disputes: Rising Tide, Rising Stakes August 2006
Book: Debating China's Exchange Rate Policy April 2008
Working Paper 11-14: Renminbi Rules: The Conditional Imminence of the Reserve Currency Transition September 2011
Testimony: A Muscular Multilateralism to Engage China on Trade September 21, 2011
Peterson Perspective: Legislation to Sanction China: Will It Work? October 7, 2011
Book: The Future of China's Exchange Rate Policy July 2009