Overview

An Agenda for Restarting Growth and Reform

JOHN WILLIAMSON

These may not be the worst of times, but few view them as among the best of times in Latin America. The region has lived through another decade of slow growth. Crises seem to have become ever more frequent, with the consequences of the Argentine crisis particularly painful. Poverty fell in the first half of the 1990s but has been increasing again since 1997. Growth in employment in the formal sector has been agonizingly slow. Investment remains substantially lower than it was in the 1970s. The world economy is in recession, the prices of many primary products were recently at record low levels, and emerging markets are out of fashion with investors. In many countries, there is disillusionment with political leaders, though in most cases—according to Latinobarómetro—not with democracy.

Of course, the pessimism can be overdone. Growth did revive in Latin America in the first half of the 1990s, until the crises started exploding. Inflation, the great enemy of the poor, has been conquered. Growth follows

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recessions: Primary product prices, like stock markets, do not go down forever. The statistics tell us that social progress—as measured specifically by longevity, literacy, and infant mortality—continued even through the decade of the debt crisis and the 1990s (see table 0.1).

But when all is said and done, Latin Americans are entitled to feel disappointed that the past decade did not live up to the hopes that were kindled at the start of the 1990s, when it was widely expected that reforms would get the region back on a growth path that would allow living standards to start catching up with those in industrial countries. The first two years of the new century saw no net increase in output at all—by far the worst performance since 1982-83, at the start of the debt crisis. Latin Americans want to know what went wrong, and they want a new agenda that promises to correct the weaknesses of the past. The chapters in this volume were primarily seeking answers to the second of those questions, but it is useful to start by confronting the first.

The authors who have contributed to this volume are 15 economists from, or associated with, Latin America. Twelve of the 15 are actually Latin Americans, 2 of whom are former finance ministers (Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski of Peru and Ricardo López Murphy of Argentina). All 15 have contributed to the development of the set of ideas that are explored in the volume and that are summarized here, and all of them sympathize with the general thrust of the argument, but they have not individually endorsed everything in this overview.

What Went Wrong?

The authors of this volume do not take the view that the liberalizing reforms of the past decade and a half, or globalization, can be held responsible for the region’s renewed travails in recent years. To consider why not, it is natural to focus attention on Argentina, the country that is now embroiled in the deepest crisis that has been experienced in the region at least since the 1980s, and that not long ago was widely regarded as the poster child for the Washington Consensus.

Argentina did indeed undertake many excellent reforms, particularly in the first half of the 1990s. It improved its fiscal performance, and the central government even had a small budget surplus in 1993. It liberalized trade. It welcomed foreign direct investment. It reformed its pension system. It privatized most state companies—though some of them perhaps too quickly, before an effective regulatory mechanism had been put in place, and in some cases with questionable propriety. It liberalized and strengthened its financial system. It legislated a world-class bankruptcy law. Most of the public-sector debt was long term, and contingent credit lines were arranged with commercial banks. And all these good policies were indeed rewarded: hyperinflation was replaced by price stability, and
Table 0.1 Basic social statistics for selected Latin American countries and other developing regions, 1960-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country or region</th>
<th>Literacy rate (percent)</th>
<th>Life expectancy (years)</th>
<th>Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>93 94 96 97</td>
<td>65 67 70 72 74</td>
<td>60 52 35 25 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>68 76 81 85</td>
<td>55 59 63 66 68</td>
<td>114 95 71 48 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>88 82 94 96</td>
<td>57 62 69 74 76</td>
<td>113 77 32 16 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>78 84 89 92</td>
<td>57 61 66 68 72</td>
<td>97 70 41 30 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>75 82 78 91</td>
<td>57 62 67 71 73</td>
<td>93 73 51 36 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>72 80 86 90</td>
<td>48 54 60 66 69</td>
<td>141 108 81 54 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>76 84 89 93</td>
<td>60 65 68 71 73</td>
<td>79 53 36 25 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and Caribbean</td>
<td>74 80 85 88</td>
<td>56 61 65 68 70</td>
<td>105 84 61 41 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and Pacific</td>
<td>55 68 79 86</td>
<td>39 59 64 67 69</td>
<td>131 79 57 44 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe and Central Asia</td>
<td>94 95 96 97</td>
<td>— — 68 69 69</td>
<td>— — 41 28 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>30 42 54 65</td>
<td>47 52 58 64 68</td>
<td>165 134 98 56 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>32 39 47 55</td>
<td>44 49 54 59 62</td>
<td>163 139 119 87 73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>28 38 50 62</td>
<td>40 44 48 50 47</td>
<td>164 138 116 103 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing countries</td>
<td>53 62 69 75</td>
<td>44 55 60 63 64</td>
<td>143 108 88 67 59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

— = not available

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.
real per capita GDP rose by a cumulative 46 percent between 1990 and 1998, which was by far the country’s best performance since at least the 1920s. Assertions that the 1990s were a decade of decline for Argentina are simply wrong.

Nevertheless, the euphoria of the early 1990s was carried altogether too far. The currency board that was adopted in 1991 to help the country exit hyperinflation was very successful in that aim, but it was an extremely rigid system that risked making the peso an overvalued currency. That risk materialized big time through a conjunction of unfortunate developments:

- The use of a fixed exchange rate to terminate an ongoing inflation normally results in the price level overshooting equilibrium, to leave an overvalued currency in its wake, and that happened in Argentina.

- The Brazilian real was drastically devalued in 1999, and this mattered a lot, given that by then Brazil was by far Argentina’s most important trading partner.

- The US dollar (to which the Argentine peso was pegged) levitated against virtually all other currencies, especially the euro, from the late 1990s to early 2002.

- Argentina’s large current account deficits throughout the 1990s meant that it would have needed a progressively more competitive real exchange rate to generate the foreign exchange with which to service its increasing foreign debt.

Although Argentina did succeed in making modest gains in its competitiveness vis-à-vis the United States in the last years of the currency board, by dint of a painful process of internal price deflation, this did not suffice to prevent a progressive increase in the overvaluation of the peso (Perry and Serven 2002). Perhaps a more flexible labor market could have made those competitiveness gains somewhat greater, but it was an essentially hopeless task; the overvaluation was simply too great to be corrected that way.

Another big policy error was, as so often in Argentina’s past, fiscal laxity. Although there was a radical improvement in the fiscal position in the early years of the decade, this was allowed to erode after 1993. The ratio of public debt to GDP rose from 29 percent in 1993 to 41 percent in 1998, and then to 55 percent in 2001. This eliminated the scope for the government to run a fiscal expansion to help stabilize the economy when it fell on hard times at the beginning of the present decade. The exchange rate straitjacket plus the inadequate fiscal effort in the good times doomed the Argentine experiment (Mussa 2002). The political implosion was the straw that broke the camel’s back, but it is difficult to see how it could have been avoided given the economic dead end.

4 AFTER THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS
Argentina was unique in adopting a currency board, yet most other countries also had a disappointing decade of slow growth, low investment, very modest increases in employment in the formal sector, and little progress in poverty reduction. That was true of most countries, but not all. In particular, Chile had the fourth fastest growing economy in the world during the 1990s. Hence a diagnosis of why things went wrong in Latin America in the 1990s needs to be evaluated in relation to Chile as well, to make sure that we have an explanation that can account for Chilean success as well as the general disappointment.

Surely the factor that has been most damaging to economic growth is the series of crises that emerging markets have suffered, starting with that in Mexico at the end of 1994 and continuing through East Asia, Russia, Brazil, Argentina, and then Brazil again (to mention only the major victims). Too many countries encouraged money to flood in and overvalue the currency when the capital markets were throwing money at the region, or used a fixed or crawling exchange rate as a nominal anchor, or pursued a procyclical fiscal policy. They thereby made themselves vulnerable to “sudden stops” in capital inflows, and they left themselves no scope to relax fiscal policy in difficult times.

The policy agenda of a decade ago certainly did not warn countries against such foolish acts, and indeed in certain cases countries may even have been encouraged to do some of those things. Note that Chile used the *encaje* to try and prevent the Chilean peso from becoming overvalued when foreign investors were flooding it with money; it avoided using the exchange rate as a nominal anchor but reduced inflation gradually through a policy of inflation targeting; and it pursued a distinctly anti-cyclical fiscal policy (Ffrench-Davis 2000). These policy choices explain why Chile, unlike almost all its neighbors, managed to avoid a macroeconomic crisis in the 1990s.

A second reason that outcomes did not match the hopes of a decade ago is that reforms were incomplete. For one thing, some of the “first-generation reforms” were neglected (perhaps most conspicuously regarding the labor market, which has remained strongly dualistic everywhere, resulting in an ever-growing informal sector) or incomplete (e.g., with regard to fiscal reform, where the massive budget deficits were eliminated but opportunity was not taken in the good times to run budget surpluses that

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1. Admittedly, two other, much smaller, countries have gone even further in tying themselves irrevocably to the dollar in recent years; both Ecuador and El Salvador have actually adopted the dollar. El Salvador seems a rather natural candidate for dollarization (it is a small country whose trade is overwhelmingly with the United States or other countries with currencies closely linked to the dollar). Ecuador is a medium-sized economy with moderate ties to the United States, so it offers an interesting experiment.

2. Ironically, this was a particular danger to countries whose economic officials were regarded as a “dream team” by the international capital markets.
would allow deficit spending in bad times). Note that Chile is the country that pushed first-generation reforms the furthest (and that had started them first), although it has to be conceded that even Chile has not done anything to liberalize its labor market. And, as already noted, it sought to make fiscal policy anticyclical and pursue structural fiscal balance.

In addition, there is a whole generation of so-called second-generation reforms, involving the strengthening of institutions, that is necessary to allow full advantage to be taken of the first-generation reforms unless institutions are already strong. Once again, Chile shows up relatively well. It has long boasted a qualified, legitimate, and uncorrupt civil service. It is also among the countries that have implemented the most ambitious agenda of institutional reforms, with the grant of independence to a central bank with a technically competent staff, significant and fiscally responsible decentralization, major modernization of the machinery to collect income tax, an ambitious judicial reform in process, and significant improvements in education (chapter 8), including full-day schooling at the secondary level. (But it lags in the medical field, as is noted in chapter 10.) Most countries of the region started from a lower institutional base and achieved far less in the way of institutional reform.

A third reason for the region’s disappointing performance is that the main objective informing policy was excessively narrow. That is, policy remained focused on accelerating growth, not on growth plus equity. There remained relatively little concern for income distribution or the social agenda, despite the fact that the region’s income is more concentrated than anywhere else in the world except a few African countries. It may make sense to focus policy overwhelmingly on growth in places where income is less unequally distributed and virtually everyone is poor, like South Asia. But that is not true of Latin America, where the elite is so rich relative to the masses that it is inconceivable that the living standards of the average person will ever catch up with those in industrial countries just through growth without a narrowing of the gap between rich and poor. A minor redistribution of income from the rich to the poor would have the same impact in reducing poverty as many years of growth with a constant income distribution, let alone of growth accompanied by further widening of the income gap.

Moreover, the denial of opportunities to the poor results in a waste of human talent that helps explain the dismal growth performance of the region. Of course, there are enormously destructive (populist) ways of trying to narrow the income gap or advancing the social agenda, and many of these have periodically been unleashed on Latin America in the past. But the mere fact that it is possible to pursue an objective destructively does not imply that one should not seek constructive ways to achieve it. In this dimension, it has to be said that Chile does not distinguish itself from the rest of Latin America. Poverty has indeed fallen in Chile during the past decade, but overwhelmingly because of growth, not because in-
come distribution has become much less unequal nor because of any great improvement in social policies.

**New Agenda I: Crisis Proofing**

Our proposed reform agenda stems directly from the preceding diagnosis of what went wrong in the 1990s. To begin with, given that we now know that crises can blow up so easily and have such devastating consequences, it needs to be an objective of the highest priority to reduce the vulnerability of the region’s countries to crises. It is true that Latin America has been chronically crisis prone practically since it achieved independence, but change is essential if the region is to have any chance of maturing into a group of stable, high-income countries.

Not only is this reduced vulnerability to crises the key to the ability to maintain a respectable average growth rate over time, but there are good reasons to believe that, because rich people are better able to protect themselves against crises (mainly by holding dollars abroad), the volatility of the region helps explain why income remains so concentrated. Some of the actions that are needed to curb volatility, like moving from an export profile dependent on a few primary commodities to a diversified industrial base, are inherently long term. But the core ones (developed in chapters 4, 5, and 6) could be implemented in the space of less than a business cycle:

- Achieve budget surpluses in times of prosperity so as to reduce debt to prudent levels and provide scope for stabilizing deficits to emerge by operation of the automatic stabilizers in bad times.\(^3\)

- Make sure that subnational governments are subject to hard budget constraints, and define their entitlement to transfers from the central government as a proportion of *national public expenditure* rather than *tax revenue*, so that they cannot undermine an anticyclical policy directed by the central government.

- Accumulate reserves and build a stabilization fund when exports (particularly those of cyclically unstable primary commodities) are strong.

- Adopt a sufficiently flexible exchange rate regime to allow external competitiveness to be improved through currency depreciation when there is a sudden stop to capital inflows or other balance of payments difficulties emerge, but do what is possible (e.g., by using measures

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3. The need to maintain consistency between fiscal and exchange rate policy is likely to curb the scope for expansionary fiscal measures during a recession in a country that maintains a less flexible exchange rate regime.
like an *encaje*) to avoid this leading to overvaluation if capital inflows threaten to become excessive.\(^4\)

- Except in small countries that have close relations with the United States in both trade and financial flows, where full dollarization makes sense, aim to minimize the use of the dollar as a currency in which residents hold savings and in which loans are contracted. Unless and until this aspiration is achieved, make banks insure risks that they incur in lending in dollars to the nontradable sector.

- Complement a flexible exchange rate with monetary policy focused on targeting a low rate of inflation.

- Strengthen prudential supervision of the banking system and enforce capital adequacy ratios to minimize the danger of banking collapses.

- Increase domestic savings so that investment can rise without undue dependence on capital imports.\(^5\) This will involve a further strengthening of structural fiscal positions, and it can also be promoted by completing the process of pension reform that has already been started in many countries.

One interesting idea discussed in chapter 4 is for some regional body to develop standards analogous to the European Union’s Maastricht criteria for fiscal discipline. We would hope that these would be more sophisticated than Maastricht’s limits of a 3 percent of GDP cap on the noncyclically adjusted budget deficit and a 60 percent cap on the ratio of public debt to GDP, and would instead aim to build pressure for a consistent anticyclical policy.

For example, the growth of government expenditures might be capped at the estimated trend rate of growth of the economy, whereas tax revenue could be required to grow at least in line with nominal GDP. A government that wished to enlarge government expenditures, or cut taxes, by more than this allowed would be expected to demonstrate to its peers in the regional monitoring organization that its plans did not prejudice the maintenance of fiscal discipline. It is to be hoped that its peers would not tolerate any chicanery of “supply-side economics” that might be presented to them to rationalize fiscal lapses. If there is a convincing need for higher public expenditures, they need to be financed soundly, if necessary by raising taxes.

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\(^4\) A good review of the possibilities in this direction is provided by Ocampo (forthcoming).

\(^5\) Although it is not discussed much in the book, my own view is that one of the benefits of cutting dependence on foreign savings is that it would increase the latitude to use capital controls strategically where they can reduce the amplitude of boom-bust cycles. It would still be important to avoid the main danger of resorting to capital controls, which is the tendency to overrate the impact they can have.
We do not offer a candidate for the regional body that should be given this monitoring responsibility, because none of those presently available appears to fit the bill. Mercosur started to seek macroeconomic policy coordination before the recent crises blew up, though without any clear concept of the strategic role that such coordination should seek to achieve. But the problems with using Mercosur for this purpose are (1) that it is currently in disarray and, more seriously, (2) that it covers only a part of the region.

The International Monetary Fund has much expertise in this area, but it has not in the past distinguished itself by a concern for cyclical stabilization, and it is not controlled from within the region. The Inter-American Development Bank, the Organization of American States, and the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean all cover the right geographical area, but none has in the past developed the appropriate sort of expertise. Perhaps it would make a useful function for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) to perform, although the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) eschews dealing with this topic and so hardly constitutes an encouraging precedent. The United States actually used its bilateral free trade agreement with Chile to bully it into curtailing use of the encaje for anticyclical purposes.

Then there is of course a further institutional question beyond identifying the body to monitor the rules: to specify a penalty for breaking the rules and an enforcement mechanism to secure payment of the penalty when it is due. We note these issues but pass them by. Our contribution is limited to identifying a need, rather than suggesting an institutional way to satisfy that need.

**New Agenda II: Completing First-Generation Reforms**

But crisis proofing the regional economy is not enough to ensure future growth. The region also needs a faster underlying rate of growth. Although much was done in the past decade and a half to implement what are now referred to as first-generation reforms, and the evidence says that these did indeed serve to accelerate rather than retard the growth rate (Fernandez-Arias and Montiel 1997; Lora and Panizza 2002; Stallings and Peres 2000), the process is still incomplete in several dimensions. Perhaps the most egregious omission has been to fail to make the labor market more flexible.

The reason for this is not difficult to comprehend, insofar as those who think they are beneficiaries of the status quo—those who have unionized formal-sector jobs—constitute an interest group that is sufficiently powerful politically to deter potential reformers, and sufficiently underprivileged economically to evoke public sympathy. Nevertheless, as chapter 9
illuminates, the rigidity in the labor market constitutes a major obstacle to an expansion of employment in the formal economy. This does not just impede faster growth, but does so primarily at the cost of some of the poorest members of society—those who are denied the opportunity to move out of the informal economy.

Is there therefore a dilemma in choosing between the interests of organized labor in maintaining the rigidities of the labor market and the interests of those in the informal sector? A crude program focused on nothing but rolling back the benefits that labor has won over the years, from severance payments to the social wage to restrictions on hours worked to prohibitions on what children (for example) are allowed to do, would indeed pose such a dilemma. But, as a perusal of chapter 9 will make clear, it is possible to envisage ways of restoring flexibility that would not prejudice the interests of organized labor (as has been achieved during the past 20 years in the Netherlands).

For example, severance payments can be replaced by a system of individual accounts, as in Colombia. The social wage can be modified to forms that give the individual worker a direct stake in the payments made on his or her behalf (e.g., by adopting defined-contribution rather than defined-benefit pension schemes, which also benefits workers by allowing much greater portability of pensions). Existing workers can be grandfathered (if they so desire, and by no means all of them would) in arrangements allowing for more flexible working hours.

Not all regulations—certainly not those limiting child labor—deserve to be scrapped. And improvements in labor market information, skill certification, and occupational training systems could improve the functioning of the labor market so as to raise productivity and reduce the waste that results from mismatches between demand and supply. It is in fact possible to design a program that would liberalize the labor market and that enlightened trade unionists would recognize as consistent with their interests.

A number of other first-generation reforms are also incomplete. In trade policy, substantial progress has been made in liberalizing imports, but apart from Mexico (with NAFTA), more recently Central America, and in the future Chile, there has been essentially no progress in improving access to the markets of developed countries (chapter 7). Latin America certainly needs an FTAA, and a successful Doha Round of negotiations in the World Trade Organization, to open up export opportunities in industrial countries, as well as to provide stability in the regulations that govern intraregional trade.

Similarly, though a lot of privatization has happened, there remain sectors—most notably in banking, with the continued existence of many state-owned banks—where the process is seriously incomplete. Latino-barómetro has discovered that privatization is by far the most unpopular
of the first-generation reforms with the Latin American public, but—as is discussed in chapter 2—the evidence simply does not support the view that privatization has not benefited the general public. It must be admitted that privatizations have sometimes been carried out badly. The remedy, however, is not to stop the process of privatization but rather to make sure that it is done carefully, and with newly privatized firms either exposed to competition or subject to proper regulation.

Finally, in the financial sector, there remain countries where the process of liberalization has not been supplemented by the necessary strengthening of prudential supervision.

New Agenda III: Second-Generation Reforms

But it would be wrong to give the impression that the only task at this juncture in history is to complete first-generation reforms. The major thrust of development economics in the 1990s was recognition of the crucial role of institutions in permitting an economy to function effectively. The importance of institutional reforms in complementing first-generation reforms in Latin America was first emphasized by Naím (1994), who dubbed these “second-generation reforms.” A recent paper by Levine and Easterly (2002) concludes that the state of institutional development furnishes the only variable that reliably predicts how developed a country is.

An important role for the state of institutions is perfectly consistent with mainstream economics, which posits a crucial role for the state in creating and maintaining the institutional infrastructure of a market economy, in providing public goods, in internalizing externalities, and, depending on political views, in correcting income distribution. (Note that none of these roles serve to rationalize a government responsibility for running steel mills, electricity generators, or banks.)

Second-generation reforms have sometimes been pictured as politically boring esoterica like creating budget offices or securities and exchange commissions. Chapter 10 argues that in fact they are liable to involve political confrontation with some of society’s most potent and heavily entrenched interest groups, such as the judiciary and public school teachers. This is surely right. The judiciary in Latin America is notorious for ignoring economic considerations, for example, by overriding creditor rights to the point where creditors are reluctant to lend. Or worse still, they are so corrupt that judges have to be paid to permit money to be recovered. Also, as noted in chapter 8, many teachers’ unions have been captured by small

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6. It can be argued that this is a misnomer, inasmuch as decently functioning institutions may be a precondition for certain liberalizing reforms, which implies that the second generation ought to precede the first!
groups with political agendas unrelated to the teaching profession. The answer, it is argued, is not to initiate a campaign to “break the unions,” but rather to seek to professionalize teaching so that teachers will want their unions to become positive partners for reform. A third politically powerful group whose attitudes and working practices often need to be transformed is the civil service.

One institutional reform that would seem a mistake is introduction of an industrial policy, that is, a program that requires some government agency to “pick winners” (to help companies that are judged likely to be able to contribute something special to the national economy). There is little reason to think that industrial policies were the key ingredient of success in East Asia (see Noland and Pack 2003); though it is true that several of those economies had some form or other of industrial policy at some stage of their development, it is also true that one of the most successful, Hong Kong, never did.

It is difficult to explain the success of a group of countries by something that one of them conspicuously lacked. One needs to look instead at the common features of those countries, such as their high saving rates, outward orientation, macroeconomic stability, work ethic, and strong educational systems. This is not to say that an industrial policy would necessarily be a disaster, because in a country with strong private firms one can expect these to ignore misguided government pressures (e.g., the attempt of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry to rationalize the Japanese car industry by telling Honda not to make cars). But we believe that government has more useful things to do than issue advice that can only be defended by arguing that firms are free to ignore it.

Specifically, though government should stay out of making business decisions—and leave those to the people who stand to gain if the decisions are good and lose if they are not—it has an important role in creating a business-friendly environment. This is partly the old-fashioned business of providing decent infrastructure, a stable and predictable macroeconomic, legal, and political environment, and a strong human resource base. But it also includes the modern task of building a national innovation system to promote the diffusion of technological information and fund precompetitive research, as well as providing tax incentives for research and development and encouraging venture capital, and may extend to encouraging the growth of industrial clusters.

Latin America has lagged badly in developing high-technology industries, as shown in the region’s poor placement in the proportion of technically sophisticated exports as well as its low ranking in the Competitiveness Indices of the World Economic Forum. Although there is still ample scope for productivity to increase in the region by copying best practices developed in the rest of the world, it may need an act of Schumpeterian innovation—and therefore the sort of technologically supportive
infrastructure that constitutes a national innovation system—to bring global best practices to Latin America.7

In addition to reforming the judiciary, teachers, and the civil service (especially budget offices, securities and exchange commissions, and central banks, which deserve autonomy even if not complete independence from the political process) and building up national innovation systems, second-generation reforms need to address two major economic areas. One involves modernizing the institutional infrastructure of a market economy. Unlike the economies in transition, which had the challenging task of creating such an infrastructure from scratch, Latin America already had the essential features of a market economy in place when the present wave of reform started in the late 1980s. Nonetheless, there are deficiencies in property rights (particularly the lack of property rights in the informal sector, to which Hernando de Soto has repeatedly drawn attention) and, in many countries, bankruptcy laws.8

The other major need for institutional reform is in the financial sector. What is needed here, in addition to strengthening prudential supervision, is a whole series of apparently minor changes such as improving transparency, upgrading accountancy, strengthening the rights of minority shareholders, facilitating the recovery of assets pledged as collateral, and developing credit registries (see chapter 5). There are also some useful ideas as to how to build financial systems based on the local currency rather than the dollar at the end of chapter 6, including requiring banks that accept dollar deposits and then lend in dollars to the nontradable sector to insure the additional risk this entails. Although such reforms may appear minor, in fact they are of fundamental importance—but quite difficult to implement.

Doubtless none of these economic institutions begin to compare in importance to the political institutions that can allow a Hugo Chávez to capture control of the state and ravage an economy, as is happening in Venezuela as this goes to press. Patricio Navia and Andrés Velasco make some suggestions in chapter 10 about the political reforms that might increase the likelihood of the political process generating the sort of progressive but responsible reforms that we advocate in this volume. They argue for the need to have a balance of power between president and legislature, rather than for gutting the legislature, with the legislators con-

7. See ECLAC (1995, part 2) for a review of the policies that would assist enterprises to catch up with global best practices.

8. Argentina had a world-class bankruptcy law until January 2002, when the Congress replaced it with a law that made debt collection virtually impossible under the misapprehension that this would limit the damage of the crisis. Of course, it would have ensured the collapse of any still-solvent banks in Argentina, which is why the IMF insisted on its amendment.
sisting of career professionals responsible to their constituents rather than either the executive or party bosses.

Navia and Velasco also tend to favor first-past-the-post electoral systems, but their thoughts on how to design proportional systems are perhaps even more interesting: keep electoral districts relatively small (about five members) and use open rather than closed lists, so as to maximize the power of voters. Hold elections for different positions simultaneously rather than subjecting countries to almost permanent electioneering. Because the other contributors to this volume have credentials as economists rather than political scientists, we cannot vouch for this reform agenda, but our impression is that it constitutes a thoughtful attempt to tackle what is without question a critical problem.

New Agenda IV: Income Distribution and the Social Sector

There are two ways through which the poor can become less poor. One is by an increase in the size of the economic pie from which everyone in society draws their income. The other is by redistribution of a given-sized pie, so that rich people get a smaller proportion and the poor get a bigger proportion. In most cases, the most effective way to give the poor a bigger proportion will be to equalize opportunities by paying more attention to the social agenda.

The evidence shows more or less clearly that growth benefits the poor, even if nothing is consciously done to make it “pro-poor” growth. Benefits do trickle down. One influential analysis concluded that the poor typically benefit more or less in proportion to what they already have (Dollar and Kraay 2000), although others have concluded that the elasticity of low incomes with respect to aggregate growth is significantly less than one (Foster and Székely 2001). But even if the poor do benefit in as great a proportion as others, they will not gain very much from economic growth if they do not have very much to start with, as is the case almost everywhere in Latin America.

Because most people believe that improving the lot of the poor matters more than securing an equal income gain for rich people, there is an abstract case for supplementing the gains from growth with a measure of income redistribution. And because a country where the poor receive a very small proportion of income needs to reallocate a relatively small part of the income of rich people to make a big dent in poverty, that case applies in spades to Latin America. If one learns that poverty increased in Mexico in the 1990s even though average per capita income increased (Székely 2001b), one may feel that the case for action to improve the distribution of income is rather compelling.
Figure 0.1 shows what Okun (1975) called “the big trade-off”—between the level of income and its equitable distribution. If society were efficiently organized, then we would be on the frontier, and any gain in equity would have to be paid for by a reduction in the level of income. If, for example, we tried to redistribute income from the rich to the poor through higher taxes and increased welfare benefits, then there would be a cost in the disincentive effects of high marginal tax rates reducing effort and therefore income. In practice, most societies are usually operating somewhere like point \( x \) in figure 0.1 within the efficient frontier so that there are opportunities for win-win solutions, and obviously one wants to identify and exploit these wherever one can. The Washington Consensus reforms that were in vogue a decade ago were focused on increasing growth without harming equity. Birdsall and de la Torre (2001) offered a list of 10 Washington Contentious reforms (along the general lines of the discussion in chapter 3) that they argued would push countries to the right in figure 0.1, improving equity without reducing growth.

Their 10 reforms constitute a sensible list, even if one can debate whether they all quite fit the rubric of improving equity without diminishing growth.\(^9\) For example, their first two proposals concern the development of:

9. The 10 reforms are rule-based fiscal discipline; smoothing booms and busts; social safety nets that trigger automatically; schools also for poor people; taxing rich people and spending more on the rest; giving small business a chance; protecting workers’ rights; dealing openly with discrimination; repairing land markets; and consumer-driven public services.
Development of fiscal rules that would secure an anticyclical fiscal policy, such as those discussed above under the heading of crisis proofing; one could argue these are at least as important for increasing the average rate of growth as for improving income distribution. But the more fundamental point is that there is no intellectual justification for arguing that only win-win solutions deserve to be considered. One always needs to be aware of the potential cost in efficiency (or growth) of actions to improve income distribution. But in a highly unequal region such as Latin America, opportunities for making large distributive gains for modest efficiency costs deserve to be seized.

Progressive taxes are the classic instrument for redistributing income. One of the more questionable aspects of the reforms of the past decade in Latin America has been the form that tax reform has tended to take, with a shift in the burden of taxation from income taxes (which are typically at least mildly progressive) to consumption taxes (which are usually at least mildly regressive). Although the tax reforms that have occurred have been useful in developing a broader tax base, it is time to consider reversing the process of shifting from direct to indirect taxation, including recently the growth of taxes on check payments. In particular, one needs an effort to increase direct tax collections. For incentive reasons, one wants to avoid increasing the marginal tax rate on earned income, which suggests that attempts to collect more from direct taxes should be focused on the following three elements:

- the development of property taxation as a major revenue source (it is the most natural revenue source for the subnational government units that are being spawned by the process of decentralization that has rightly become so popular);
- the elimination of tax loopholes, which not only can increase revenue but can also simplify tax obligations and thus aid enforcement; and
- better tax collection, particularly of the income earned on flight capital parked abroad, which will require the signing of tax information-sharing arrangements with at least the principal havens for capital flight.

Any increase in tax revenue then needs to be devoted to spending on basic social services, including a social safety net as well as education and health, so that the net effect will significantly reduce inequality, particularly by expanding opportunities for the poor. But it may be a mistake to limit the benefits exclusively to the poor, because at least in some circumstances it is only a middle-class stake in public spending that gives the extra spending a chance of being politically sustainable. At the same time, it must always be remembered that spreading expenditures more broadly to include nonpoor people inevitably reduces the antipoverty impact of a given level of expenditures.

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Even with the best will in the world, however, what is achievable through the tax system is limited, in part by the fact that one of the things that money is good at buying is advice on how to minimize a tax bill. Really significant improvements in distribution will come only by remedying the fundamental weakness that causes poverty, which is that too many people lack the assets that would enable them to work their way out of poverty.

The basic principle of a market economy is that people exchange like value for like value. Hence, to earn a decent living the poor must have the opportunity to offer something that others want and will pay to buy; those who have nothing worthwhile to offer because they have no assets are unable to earn a decent living. The solution is not to abolish the market economy, which was tried in the communist countries for 70 years and proved a disastrous dead end, but instead to give the poor access to assets that will enable them to make and sell things that others will pay to buy. This means

- **Education.** There is no hope unless the poor get more human capital than they have had in the past. Latin America has made some progress in improving education in the past decade (see chapter 8), but it is still lagging on a world scale.

- **Titling programs** to provide property rights to the informal sector and allow Hernando de Soto’s (2000) “mystery of capital” to be unlocked.

- **Land reform.** The Brazilian program of recent years to help peasants buy land from latifundia landlords provides a model. Landlords do not feel their vital interests to be threatened and therefore they do not resort to extreme measures to thwart the program. Property rights are respected. The peasants get opportunities but not handouts, which seems to be what they want.

- **Microcredit.** Organizations to supply microcredit are spreading, but they still serve only about 2 million of Latin America’s 200 million poor people. The biggest obstacle to an expanded program consists of the very high real interest rates that have been common in the region. These high interest rates mean either that microcredit programs have a substantial fiscal cost and create an incentive to divert funds to the less poor (if interest rates are subsidized), or (otherwise) that they do not convey much benefit to the borrowers. We expect our macroeconomic program to reduce market interest rates and thus facilitate the spread of microcredit.

Mechanisms like these are becoming more and more realistic because of the strengthening of civil society, which is one of the most positive trends in the region. They will nonetheless take time to produce a social revolu-
tion, for the very basic reason that they rely on the creation of new assets, and it takes time to produce new assets. But unlike populist programs, they do have the potential to produce a real social revolution if they are pursued steadfastly. And they could do so without jeopardizing the interests of rich people, thus holding out the hope that these traditionally fragmented societies might finally begin to develop real social cohesion.

Criticisms

It is not difficult to anticipate some of the criticisms that will be directed at this agenda. It is all about reforms that need to be made in Latin America, whereas many of the region’s problems are due to, or at least intensified by, policies that are made outside the region. True enough, but we have written an agenda directed at the leaders of the region, not at their peers in the rest of the world. Apart from a few brief paragraphs in chapter 11, we are silent on the illegal drug problem and environmental issues. True again; we plead the benefits of a division of labor, and we do not question the importance of these issues.

Another possible criticism is that the agenda we have sketched out is a medium-term one that omits any discussion of how Argentina and Brazil can escape from the crises of 2002. That again is a valid criticism, to which we again plead division of labor. In addition, we would say that the region will never escape from the treadmill of repeated crises unless policymakers begin to pay more attention to long-term issues rather than being constantly mesmerized by the latest crisis. We look primarily to fiscal reform to enable countries to gradually work down the level of public debt and thus escape the vulnerability to panics by foreign creditors that now hangs over the region.

A more pertinent criticism is that the policy agenda laid out above does not offer an alternative model of development; it is very much in line with the sort of national economic policies that developing countries subscribed to when they endorsed the Monterrey Consensus. That is a perfectly legitimate criticism from anyone who believes they do have such an alternative, but the view of the authors of this book is that past alternatives failed and that the antiglobalization movement of today has so far not provided a coherent alternative at all. The way forward is to complete, correct, and complement the reforms of a decade ago,10 not to reverse them.

Others may criticize our agenda as unrealistically broad. No country can be expected to implement everything suggested here all at once, and we fail to give much guidance on sequencing. Those criticisms also have

10. This is to “reform the reforms,” in the felicitous phrase of Ffrench-Davis (2000), which was subsequently adopted by the Inter-American Development Bank in the program for its 2002 annual meeting.
substance. Of course, it will be necessary to sequence the reforms, and it would be foolish to try and do everything at once. But does anyone really believe that there exists some unique sequence that should be prescribed for all 32 countries of the region? Surely how quickly reforms are implemented and which are tackled first has to depend on the situation in each country and the political priorities of its leaders, and to suggest otherwise would be an attempt to subvert the democratic process.

The key question is whether the agenda we have laid out will reignite growth in Latin America. Those who look to tax cuts to puff up demand or work magic with incentives, or who look to new inflows of foreign capital to avoid the need for hard choices, will doubtless be skeptical. But our view is that what the region needs is not so much an immediate boom, nice as that would be, as the sustainable and sustained growth that comes from making it worthwhile for the private sector, from multinationals to microentrepreneurs, to invest and sell.

Our agenda is directed at creating the conditions from which such growth can emerge. Perhaps the biggest risk of all is that the region’s leaders will lack the patience that is needed for such an approach to succeed.