Who really are ethnic Koreans and who are they not in Japanese society? To answer this question is not an easy task. They are sometimes wrongly taken for Korean-Japanese, that is, Koreans residing in Japan with Japanese nationality. Actually, these people may or may not be included in the concept of ethnic Koreans, depending on the scope and the context of argument. The overwhelming majority of ethnic Koreans are legally foreigners with foreign passports, and accordingly their legal status should not be considered parallel to that of people in other countries, such as Korean-Americans.

For a closer understanding of the concept, we must retrace the modern history of Korea and Japan and their interrelationships. A smattering of history will convince one how and why the illusion that Japan is ethnically homogeneous—which I have termed the “homogeneity myth”¹—has spread so widely among Japanese citizens. It was this kind of consciousness that, together with the North-South division of the Korean peninsula, had made the legal status of Korean residents so complicated and peculiar to Japan.

In this chapter, I try to describe the past and the present situations of Koreans in Japan, making utmost use of official statistical data, as well as the results of my own work. In the second and third sections, I

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¹ See Tamura (1983b).
introduce my own definition of the concept of Zainichi Koreans. “Zainichi” literally implies people residing in Japan, but customarily the word has been used to designate Korean residents. Because the most appropriate statistical time series that correspond to my definition are the demographic figures in the Japanese census, I put in order the census-based population figures so as to show how Korean immigrants have come to constitute the largest ethnic minority group in Japan.

The fourth section concerns explanations of the complexity of the post-war Japanese immigration control and registration systems, and with the process whereby they have been improved. In my opinion, what distinguishes discrimination from prejudice is the existence of acts or the exercise of power from the side of the majority in any sense, ranging from speeches and violence to customs and institutions—and in some cases even the knowledge of the fact that others are discriminated against in one’s neighborhood (statistical discrimination!).

Needless to say, prejudice may cause and aggravate discrimination, but the causality also may go the other way around. At any rate, it is my belief that—as far as Koreans in Japan are concerned and apart from psychological elements—their legal status is one of the crucial factors that have enabled the Japanese to segregate these people from daily opportunities. This explains why I am so inclined to examine legal problems in this chapter.

In the fifth section, I show the recent situations in which Koreans are put, again making use of census data. For the convenience of comparison, I try to add the information on the Chinese people living in Japan, whose relative weight has rapidly increased in recent years. In the strata of communities of immigrants, recent Chinese and Korean arrivals are frequently called “newcomers.” Even if we count early arrivals and latecomers in a lump, their ethnic densities (weights in the total population) cannot be overestimated. Nonetheless, there are political leaders like Shintaro Ishihara, the governor of Tokyo, who in his speeches trifles Korean and Chinese immigrants in contempt, calling them sangokujin (people of the third countries), a derogatory phrase once popular among Japanese in the days immediately after the surrender at the end of World War II in 1945.2

Finally, the sixth section of the chapter is devoted to conclusions. To my regret, I am forced to fully rely on the official data published by the Japanese government. I know there are plenty of materials and research findings accumulated by local governments, private institutions and groups, and so on. But they do not necessarily provide a good basis

2. Ishihara is reported to have said in the Spiegel, April 12, 2000, that sangokujin may “rise in riot.” Again on April 10, 2000, he made a similar warning speech during a ceremony at the Ground Self-Defense Force’s garrison.
for the following exposition. In addition, I cannot conduct any analyses in line with standard economic theories (e.g., the economics of discrimination). For these remaining tasks, I have to ask the reader to expect another effort.

**Historical Background**

One of the most disputable problems in our argument is how to define ethnic Koreans in their historical context. The ethnological definition contradicts the historical fact that Japan as a nation itself was a mixture of people from neighboring nations. Even the emperors Hirohito and Akihito acknowledged that the imperial family was of Korean origin.

Yet the legal definition based on the nationality concept becomes awkward in two senses. First, with the annexation of Taiwan and Korea to Japan in 1895 and 1910, respectively, people in the colonial territories were deprived of their native nationalities and incorporated into the Japanese nation. Legally, therefore, there were no Koreans in the prewar Japanese Empire. Second, the legal definition excludes those who adopted Japanese nationality after the end of World War II in 1945.

To explain the second point more precisely, the postwar Japanese government did not give the people from ex-colonial regions the right to choose their nationalities, on the ground that the Potsdam Declaration of 1945 and the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 treated these people as the subjects of victorious nations, and accordingly Taiwanese and Koreans remaining in Japan were given the residential status of foreigners. It was in 1965 that the Japan-South Korea Treaty and the accord concerning the status of Koreans in Japan were signed. The latter accord first gave Korean residents (only those with South Korean nationality who had been in Japan before the war and their descendents) the legal status of permanent residence. Hence the most realistic and practical way of defining ethnic Koreans in Japan would be to restrict them to Zainichi (people residing in Japan) in the narrower sense.³

More concretely, I propose to define Zainichi in the narrower sense as those who fall under any of the following three categories and their descendents: (1) Korean nationals who moved to Japan before the annexation; (2) people who moved to Hondo, or the Japanese Main Islands (Japan Proper), during the colonial period; and (3) those who remained in Japan after the end of World War II either as nationals of victorious countries or with foreign passports, and—especially after the restoration of diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1965—people who landed in Japan with long-run or permanent residential status.

³ The meaning of narrowness in this definition will become clear in the succeeding sections.
According to the *Teikoku Tokei Nenkan* (Statistical Yearbook of the Empire), which had been the sole reliable source before the Japanese censuses, there were only 4 Koreans in 1882, and 790 in 1909, the year before the annexation (1910). A common opinion of historians has been that most of them were diplomats, students, and political refugees. Recent research has revealed, however, that there were a variety of muscular laborers in those days, indicating that the Japanese economy started to introduce a Korean workforce at the early stage of industrialization.

Another data source is the research on households and inhabitants conducted by the Naimusho Keihokyoku (Police Bureau, Ministry of Domestic Affairs) for the period 1913-44, which covers the Korean population in Hondo, Japan (henceforth, Police Bureau population) by prefecture and by occupation since 1915, by sex since 1920, and by Joju (usually living) and non-Joju. The censuses in Japan have been conducted since 1920, and accordingly the definition of Joju population in the Police Bureau data seem to correspond to that of the census data, that is, “those persons who had lived or were going to live for three months or more at their respective households at the census date.”

The census figures for Joju Koreans (henceforth, the census population) are available for 1920, 1930, and 1940. Unfortunately, the coverage of the Police Bureau population is only 74 percent of the census population in 1920, goes down to 71 percent in 1830, and rises to 96 percent in 1940. This is why I started to estimate the census-based annual Korean population in Hondo, Japan during the whole colonial period (1910-45) by prefecture, sex, and occupation. Figure 5.1 summarizes the results by sex for national totals.

My estimation of the census Korean population in 1910 is 2,600, of which the female population was merely 244. The total population increased to 40,755 in 1920, and to 419,009 in 1930, with the sex ratio gradually improving from 7.65 in 1920 to 2.45 in 1930. The total hit the 1 million mark in 1939, and it was 2,206,541 at the end of World War II, with a sex ratio of 1.64. Needless to say, the whole process of improvement in sex ratios reflects the widening of working opportunities for women and increased family reunions. It should be noted here that the extremely high sex ratios in the early years support the recent findings cited above. This point can be confirmed by my estimates of census Koreans by occupation.

As table 5.1 indicates, a characteristic feature of census Koreans in the early years of the colonial period is their surprisingly high rates of labor participation, centering on physical labor. Although the weight of work-

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5. My work with this estimation problem started in 1977, and after the reestimation of previous results, I published Tamura (1999).
ing people decreases keeping step with feminization (the improvement in sex ratios), physical labor maintains the top priority even in the later years. Behind this finding was a dark side of Japanese colonialism and militarism, as we will see below. The number of students and school pupils was 182 in 1910, and it reached 1,000 in 1930, 50,000 in 1935, and roughly 250,000 in 1945.

Geographical proximity outweighed the economic, social, and other factors at the outset. My estimates by birthplace indicate that Cheju Do, a vol-

**Table 5.1 Population of ethnic Koreans in Japan by occupation, according to the census, 1910-45**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Professional</th>
<th>Commerce</th>
<th>Agriculture and fishery</th>
<th>Laborers</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Labor force</th>
<th>Total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>1,913</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2,235</td>
<td>2,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1,052</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>6,687</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>8,831</td>
<td>9,939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>31,196</td>
<td>999</td>
<td>33,722</td>
<td>40,755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>3,056</td>
<td>2,201</td>
<td>137,910</td>
<td>3,327</td>
<td>146,823</td>
<td>179,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>13,773</td>
<td>2,251</td>
<td>232,538</td>
<td>30120</td>
<td>279,181</td>
<td>419,009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>1,474</td>
<td>44,155</td>
<td>5,948</td>
<td>349,486</td>
<td>23,707</td>
<td>424,770</td>
<td>765,947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>3,850</td>
<td>73,231</td>
<td>8,821</td>
<td>519,919</td>
<td>31,604</td>
<td>637,425</td>
<td>1,241,315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>10,116</td>
<td>68,540</td>
<td>18,255</td>
<td>994,588</td>
<td>35,591</td>
<td>1,127,090</td>
<td>2,206,541</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Tamura (1999).
canic island off the southern tip of the Korean peninsula, has been the major supplier of immigrants to Japan. In the early years, most of them landed at the ports of the nearest prefectures, such as Fukuoka and Yamaguchi, directly, or via Busan, Korea, the major seaport through which more than 90 percent of emigrants sailed for Hondo. As time passed, however, the range of birthplaces of immigrants went up north, while their main residential places in Hondo, Japan moved eastward up to Osaka.

In 1910, the share of Fukuoka in the distribution of Koreans’ residential areas was 15.15 percent, and those of Yamaguchi, Osaka, and Tokyo were respectively 7.27, 9.35, and 15.81 percent. The share of Osaka increased to 22.52 percent in 1925, and those of Fukuoka and Tokyo went shoulder to shoulder at slightly less than 10 percent. This means that attractive economic forces outweighed geographical and the sociopolitical gravity. What is important here is the share of Hokkaido, the extreme northern district of Japan; its share increased from 1.15 percent of 1910 to 3.46 percent in 1945, which again suggests the dark side of the history. In the post-war years, the geographical distribution of Koreans has become stable, in the sense that the Kinki Area with Osaka at its center has been maintaining almost half of the population, followed by the Kanto Area including Tokyo, with a share of about 20 percent. 6

Let us now reinterpret the above process from the point of view of the immigration control policy of the Japanese government. Until the outbreak of the 3.1 Independence Movement in 1919, the “generous” stance of the Hondo government, contrary to the militaristic rule in the Korean peninsula, helped to attract more and more Koreans to Hondo. While undertaking conciliatory measures in the Korean peninsula, the Hondo government started to force Korean immigrants to carry travelers’ certificates.

This policy change could be seen as an immediate consequence of the Independence Movement, but at the same time it reflected the anti-Korean sentiment among the Japanese brought up in Hondo society. The heavy economic slumps after World War I, together with the increasing number of Korean immigrants, touched off Japanese frustrations and paved the way for making Koreans scapegoats for the social unrest, culminating in the massacre of Koreans amid the Kanto earthquake disaster, on September 1, 1923. In many communities (even in police offices), mobs or bands of vigilantes—incited by false rumors intentionally spread by the authority—killed about 6,000 to 10,000 Koreans. 7

The social unrest after the earthquake put the Hondo government in a position to implement a tighter immigration control policy. Local marshals on the Korean peninsula were given the right to suspend the is-

suance of the certificates at their disposal. The Emigration Control Office at Busan, which had been set up in 1937, was at the forefront of the so-called Genchi Soshi (On-the-Spot Suspension) Policy. As Japan rushed to the wartime system, however, a switchover of the policy was decided in such a way as to introduce positively the Korean workers to Hondo and other territories for the forced labor, and to send the Korean soldiers and girls (comfort women) to the war fronts.

According to Park Kyung Shik, 725,000 Koreans were drafted for military services and forced labor during the period 1939-45, the last stage of World War II.\(^8\) An increase of the share of Hokkaido indicated above partly testifies to the conscription and concentration of Korean youth in coalmines, construction sites, and so on. About 4,300 Koreans were left discarded at the time of Japanese withdrawal from Sakhalin, an island lying north of Hokkaido and now under Russian rule. Moreover, many Korean Hibakusha (A-bomb victims) are still waiting for medical care and financial aid.

### The Postwar Situation

The story does not end with the topics in the previous section. Since 1950, the census has been conducted every 5 years. The population of Joju Koreans according to the 1950 census was 464,277, a sharp decline from 1945, mainly due to the repatriation of 1,100,000 to 1,410,000 Koreans to their homelands, North Korea and South Korea. In accordance with the agreement between the Red Cross of Japan and its North Korean counterpart, 93,444 Koreans were sent back to the North as of 1976.\(^9\) Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, according to the census, the population of Koreans remained stable at about 520,000. It started to increase at an incomparably slower pace than the prewar pace, and then attained its first peak of 570,000 in 1986.

Japan’s surrender at the end of World War II gave birth to the *nationality clause problem* concerning the legal status of ex-colonial descents. The Alien Registration Law of 1952 took away Japanese nationality from these ethnic minorities and treated them the same as other foreigners in general. Thus they have been shut out from governmental and semigovernmental organizations, as well as large business firms or professional occupations, because of the nationality clauses inserted implicitly or explicitly in laws, rules, regulations and so on. This type of occupational segregation forced them to rush into the “ethnic” industries, such as restaurants, finance, entertainment, and other service-related businesses.

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Since the 1980s, however, the narrow gate to full participation in Japanese society has been forced open little by little, at the cost of countering the inflow of Japanese nationals and Korean “newcomers” into the ethnic industries. A remarkable change happened in 1982, when public research institutes including universities were allowed to employ foreigners on their permanent staffs. The Nationality Law was amended in 1985 so as to recognize eligibility for Japanese citizenship through either the paternal or maternal line. The New Immigration Control Law of 1990 intended to invite a wider range of newcomers from South Korea, China, Brazil, and countries in other regions.

The mid-1980s were a turning point not only for the Japanese economy but also for Koreans in Japan. Concurrently with the “internationalization” of Japan—that is, the opening up of society to more and more foreign laborers and students—the Zainichi Koreans are now facing a prospective crisis of extinction: the possibility that their community might disappear within several generations. Aside from newcomers, people who had moved to Japan during the colonial period and their direct descendants were aging, and accordingly the memories of the past history were diminishing among younger generations. The number of Koreans who want to be naturalized in Japan has been increasing sharply in recent years. The main reasons for their decisions to apply for naturalization are said to be, among others, job hunting, marriage to a Japanese citizen, and their children starting school.

Although the number of applicants for naturalization is not available, family law specialists compiled annual data for those who acquired Japanese nationality for the period 1952-99. According to their research, only 232 Koreans were naturalized in 1952. After the mid-1970s, however, the number increased to between 4,500 and 6,000, and then went up to nearly 10,000 after the mid-1990s. The total for the whole period is 233,920 (73.6 percent of the total permitted applicants). In comparison, the 1999 census recorded the ethnic Korean population as 530,649 (figure 5.2).

There are two ways of tracing the postwar trends in the Korean population. One is to follow the census data for every 5 years after 1950. Aside from the census, we can make use of the annual data gathered under the Immigration Control Act and the Alien Registration Law. Let us refer to the latter as the registered population, which covers all foreign residents, except those persons exempted from registration and those departing from Japan within 90 days from the date of landing, or within 60 days after birth. Among them are long-term residents and permanent residents, and their spouses and children. Because the foreigners’ registration system in Japan has been and still is very complicated, we discuss this and related problems further in the next section. Here it suffices to note

that the registered population is a concept wider than the census population, the latter being slightly smaller numerically than the Zainichi in the narrower sense.

In the same way as I endeavored for the colonial period, I have also put in order the estimated results of the annual census-based Korean population by sex and prefecture for the period 1950-80 (Tamura 1984). In preparing the present chapter, I extended the periods of estimation to 1947-49 and 1981-2000, but only for national totals. I leave the detailed explanation of the estimation procedures to a footnote. The results are summarized in figure 5.2.

According to my estimates, the number of registered Koreans increased until it peaked at 693,000 in 1991, which caused an increase in the census population, with a peak of 572,000 in 1986. The time lag between the two peaks explains the explosive rush of newcomers due to Japan’s relaxation of its immigration control policy on one hand, and liberalization of overseas traveling in South Korea on the other. Thanks to the

11. This time, I made use of a very simple regression equation: \( \ln X(t) = 0.6244 + 0.93295 \ln X(t-1) \), with \( t \)-values respectively (1.145071) and (23.33003), and \( X(t) \) being the Police Bureau population in year \( t \). In addition, \( N = 53(1948-2000) \), \( R^2(\text{adjusted}) = .912648 \), \( S^2 = .02158 \), and \( DW = 2.059123 \). Although it is easy to improve the regression equation, let us be content with this provisional result for the moment.
newcomers more than compensating for the decrease in the census population, the latter attained the second peak of 575,000 in 1992, but it tended to go down as soon as the new wave of the inflow paused and started declining. Needless to say, the long-lasting slump in the Japanese economy has been the key factor in the recent decrease in registered Koreans.

**Nationality and the New Registration System**

The institutional basis that allows Japan to treat Zainichi differently from Japanese nationals goes back to a Circular Notice issued in 1952 by a bureau chief of the predecessor agency of the Ministry of Justice. The notice declared that (1) Koreans and Taiwanese, inclusive of those residing in Japan, were deprived of their Japanese nationality, and (2) they had to go through the same formalities as foreigners in general if they were to be naturalized in Japan. The notice was then embodied in the Alien Registration Law of 1952, which, together with the Immigration Control Act of the previous year, paved the way for the establishment of the basic principle of the postwar immigration control and registration systems in Japan. Foreigners thus have been required to be fingerprinted and usually carry a certificate of alien registration.

The first example of the principle was the Law for the Protection of War Victims (1952), which, by means of the nationality and registration clauses, shut out ex-colonial residents from almost all kinds of national indemnities other than those concerning the atomic bomb victims. Then the same clauses came to be inserted in bills or notices, as well as regulations and other forms of rules issued by the government and semigovernmental bodies—both central and local, and public and private institutions, and so on. Even today, many public and private institutions unconsciously imitate the texts of others, and, as it turns out, “contribute” to the exclusion of foreign residents from daily opportunities. In my personal experience, I have found several examples of this kind of exclusion for admission into a city assembly (public!) and membership in a golf club (private!).

What has had a graver impact on Zainichi are the cases of social welfare measures, qualifying examinations, financial transactions, and employment practices. In most welfare measures, such as pension plans and livelihood protections, nationality clauses have been gradually removed with some interim measures, especially after Japan ratified the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (1979) and the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1982). However, there are such cases as the national pension scheme, where imperfect interim measures left the elderly and the physically handicapped without relief.
Finally, many lawsuits have been filed by Koreans and Chinese against the Japanese government, local autonomous bodies, and business enterprises that once were committed to using forced labor. Most of the lawsuits have been seeking compensation for damages caused either by nationality clauses in postwar regulations or by conscription during the colonial period. It has been very difficult, however, for the plaintiffs to win their cases.

It is now clear that the New Immigration Control Act (1990) and the amended Alien Registration Act (1992) were to conform to the latest trends in international society. Diplomatically, the new system was the direct result of the agreement between Japan and South Korea on the treatment of the descendants of the Permanent Residents by Accord, a legal status originally introduced through diplomatic settlement in 1965 and applied only to South Korean nationals.

By the Accord of 1965, Korean nationals residing in Japan after the colonial period were able to apply for permanent residency. As for their descendants, however, the accord went through further consultations for 25 years from the day it came into effect. Then the two governments arrived at a new agreement in 1991 on the treatment of descendants of the Permanent Residents by Accord, and, corresponding to this, the Japanese government promulgated the Special Law on Immigration Control in 1991, by which those who have continuously resided in Japan since the end of World War II or before and their lineal descendants were classified as Special Permanent Residents (SPRs).

Under the new system, therefore, there are two broad categories of permanent residents, SPRs and General Permanent Residents (GPRs), the latter being applicable to foreigners in general. The new system made SPRs and GPRs free from legal limitations on daily activities, including length of stay and fingerprinting, in exchange for the duty to describe the full list of family members in the application form. But for spouses and children of Japanese nationals and permanent residents, the period of stay is either 1 year or 3 years, depending on their individual situations.

Apart from these, there is another category named Teijusha (Long-Term Residents, or LTRs), indicating those who are authorized to reside in Japan for a period of stay designated by the minister of justice after considering individual circumstances. It follows that Zainichi in the narrower sense correspond to the sum total of people of five status categories: SPRs, GPRs, foreign spouses and children of SPRs and GPRs, Korean spouses and children of Japanese people, and LTRs.

In general, there are 22 categories of nonpermanent residential status, other than the 5 listed above. These nonpermanent residents are not required to describe the family list in the application, but have to comply with fingerprinting if they are 16 years of age or more and if their total period of stay is more than 1 year. Those who come under any of the following 5 categories are exempted from the registration duty: (1) Those
who depart from Japan within 90 days from the date of landing or within 60 days of the date of birth; (2) those who have been granted a provisional stay; (3) those granted a transit stay or emergency stay, or crew members; (4) diplomats or officials; and (5) members and civilian employees of the US armed forces. Table 5.2 shows registered Koreans by residential category. The permanent residents in row 1 of the table are the sum of GPRs and SPRs, and Zainichi are the sum of rows 1 through 5.

I have been stressing that my definition of Zainichi in this chapter is “narrower.” It is now time to explain in what sense it is narrower. Indeed, the concept in table 5.2 is broader than the permanent resident categories that exclude spouses and children. But the former is narrower in the sense that it does not take into account either of those who have been actually residing in Japan for long with a nonpermanent visa other than the status of LTR, or of those who have been already naturalized, with illegal residents being disregarded.

By definition, we cannot cite the statistical figures for illegal entry. Nor do we know how many Koreans with a formal visa have gone underground after landing legally. According to the records of the Immigration Control Office, roughly 10,000 Koreans are sent back home annually. The annual number of Koreans arrested for working illegally is almost of the same order.

Many students, professors, and business workers have been applying for an extension of stay or a change of residential status. The economic success of South Korea produced a mass exodus of “happy” emigrants, in the late 1980s, to the United States, Canada, Australia, and Japan, with the result of rising “category jumpers” in these countries. The long-term legal residents with a short-term visa who have not been successful with category jumping, renewal, or extension must have been repeating to-and-fro moves between the home and host countries immediately before the expiration of residential permission.

The bottom row of table 5.2 gives the estimated census figures for registered Koreans living in Japan. The slight gaps between the Zainichi and the census data are attributable to the differences in definitions and methods of investigation. In the next section, we describe the status quo of Zainichi Koreans. Observations based on table 5.2 will satisfactorily explain the usefulness of census data for this purpose.

The Economic Role and Status of Koreans

One of the most serious problems Japan is now facing is a prospective decrease in population due to a decline in the birthrate. Government demographic experts are warning that Japan’s population will peak at 127

million in 2007 and then decrease to 67 million by 2100. The declining birthrate has been requiring the revision and rescheduling of future programs concerning, for example, education, tax system, pension schemes, and the labor market.\textsuperscript{13} The Korean community is no exception to this trend, as table 5.3 suggests.

A glance at table 5.3 will convince one how rapidly the Korean community has been aging. One might well be impressed by a slight increase in the share of population in the labor force (those of age 15 to 64 years), but hidden behind this is a sharp decline in the population below age 14. As of 2000, the share of the elderly population (65 and over) was 14.8 percent for the national total including foreigners, whereas the share of the population 14 years and below is 15.3 percent (these figures are not in the table). In the case of Koreans, a drastic decrease in infants’ population within these 15 years has contributed to shaping the lantern-shaped age structure.

The labor participation rates in table 5.4 are defined as ratios of people in the labor force to those above 15 years of age. The older cohort of the Korean community has shown a slight decrease in this rate, but it is not a conspicuous one, in both sexes and in comparison with the national total. Rather than the Koreans’ case, an extremely low rate of labor force participation by Chinese residents poses a difficult question. My tentative answer to this is that, because their community is composed of relatively smaller proportions of infants and older people, the remaining young generations are either attending schools and/or universities, or are in workplaces segregated from other ethnic groups.

\textsuperscript{13} Tamura (2002).
This interpretation is supported by the rates of unemployment in table 5.4. Although the census does not give us information on wages and salaries, incomes, and livelihoods by ethnic group, the low level of unemployment rates of Chinese residents, together with the very large proportion of temporary employed workers in table 5.5, permit us to say that many Chinese are employed in jobs that well-paid Korean workers are reluctant to take. Moreover, why are Koreans’ unemployment rates so high, irrespective of sex and time period? My personal observations give me the impression that frequent job switching is not unusual among Korean youth. The difficulty in getting positions in big firms may have discouraged them to hunt for new jobs. And they must have borne the burden of the prolonged slump since the Plaza Accord (1985), which caused the abrupt evaluation of the yen. But, of course, these reasons do not tell the whole story. In any case, this question must be a task left for my further scrutiny.

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Let us now focus on employment status across industries, as shown in table 5.5. First, contrary to the Chinese case, the high proportion of regular employees, above all in the service industry, attracts our attention. The share of the self-employed is also very high, exceeding the average of the national total. Second, the most popular industry is a marketing-related one, followed by services, manufacturing, and construction. In these industries, many Korean businesspeople are engaged in owner-manager type individual enterprises. This fact may not conform to the general image of Koreans centering on so-called ethnic industries. Third, though not shown in the table, manufacturing comes first in the ranking of popularity among Chinese, followed by marketing, and then services. Reflecting the postindustrialization of the Japanese economy, however, the overall employment structure of Japan is shifting toward service industries.
Table 5.5 Employment status of ethnic Chinese and Koreans in Japan by industry, 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Employed persons</th>
<th>Employees</th>
<th>Self-employed*</th>
<th>Family workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Regular</td>
<td>Temporary</td>
<td>Directors (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koreans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>255,880</td>
<td>157,142</td>
<td>125,701</td>
<td>31,441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A) Agriculture</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B) Forestry</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) Fisheries</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(D) Mining</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(E) Construction</td>
<td>34,891</td>
<td>19,492</td>
<td>16,249</td>
<td>3,243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(F) Manufacturing</td>
<td>40,544</td>
<td>24,862</td>
<td>20,867</td>
<td>3,995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(G) Electricity and gas*c</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(H) Transport d</td>
<td>13,311</td>
<td>10,152</td>
<td>8,765</td>
<td>1,387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(I) Wholesale and retail trade</td>
<td>79,813</td>
<td>42,817</td>
<td>31,399</td>
<td>11,418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(J) Finance and insurance</td>
<td>8,471</td>
<td>6,757</td>
<td>6,423</td>
<td>334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(K) Real estate</td>
<td>6,867</td>
<td>2,738</td>
<td>2,499</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(L) Services</td>
<td>62,189</td>
<td>42,836</td>
<td>34,569</td>
<td>8,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(M) Government e</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N) Other establishments f</td>
<td>8,096</td>
<td>6,446</td>
<td>4,213</td>
<td>2,233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>148,086</td>
<td>84,846</td>
<td>72,546</td>
<td>12,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>107,794</td>
<td>72,296</td>
<td>53,155</td>
<td>19,141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>121,574</td>
<td>105,701</td>
<td>72,167</td>
<td>33,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>62,669</td>
<td>53,622</td>
<td>39,331</td>
<td>14,291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>58,905</td>
<td>52,079</td>
<td>32,836</td>
<td>19,243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>62,977,960</td>
<td>48,763,866</td>
<td>42,042,051</td>
<td>6,721,335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>37,248,770</td>
<td>28,417,698</td>
<td>26,179,128</td>
<td>2,238,570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>25,729,190</td>
<td>20,345,689</td>
<td>15,862,923</td>
<td>4,482,765</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. (1) self-employed, employing others; (2) self-employed, not employing others.
b. Electricity, gas, heat supply, and water.
c. Transport and communications.
d. Wholesale and retail trade, and eating and drinking places.
e. Government (and not elsewhere classified).
f. Establishments not adequately reported.

Source: Japanese census.
This seems to be the best place to conduct an empirical study making use of a framework provided by economic theories, but again further research is required. My conjecture at this stage of study is that, with a little more side information on labor conditions, I would have been able to estimate the numerical magnitudes of several important concepts in economics, for example, discrimination coefficients as proposed by Becker and Arrow.¹⁴

I can calculate the Segregation Index (SI) for Koreans and Chinese on the basis of the census. This index is defined by the formula

\[ SI = \left( \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} Y(i) / Y - Z(i) / Z)}{2(1 - D)} \right) \]

where \( Y(i) / Y \) is a share of a minority group’s population in the \( i \)th industry, \( Y \) being its total over \( n \) industries, and \( Z(i) \) and \( Z \) the share and the sum of the national total, respectively. Moreover, \( D = Y / Z \) designates the ethnic density of the group in question. It is clear that SI assumes 0 when \( Ys \) and \( Zs \) are identically distributed, while it takes the value of 1 if they are concentrated at the opposite extreme.¹⁵ The segregation indices with respect to Koreans and Chinese employment distributions in 2000 are as shown in table 5.6.

Indeed, though the results do not seem to be of special interest, I can point out two findings. First, skewed sex ratios of the Korean and national totals produced awkward results in ethnic densities. In the Korean case, the high female density compensated for the low male density.

In the Chinese case, however, the density of total Chinese is less than the densities of individual sexes. All in all, Koreans are enjoying a higher share per thousand than Chinese. Second, Segregation Indices reveal that there is no difference between both sexes within each ethnic group, but the Koreans’ occupational distribution across industries is more remote than the Chinese one from that of the national total. By definition, Koreans are more “segregated” than Chinese, to the extent that the former’s SI is higher than the latter’s.

So much for the employment problem. Let us go on to the two other topics. Table 5.7 summarizes an interesting fact concerning the “international” marriages of Korean and Chinese husbands. According to this table, the number of couples with Japanese husbands and Korean wives exceeds, only at the margin of 5,000, the number of those with the opposite combination, which is a sharp contrast to the Japanese-Chinese couples.

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¹⁴ Becker (1971); Arrow (1972a, 1972b).

¹⁵ Since \( Ys \) are a part of \( Zs \) with the same dimensions, it is easy to see that SI in the text is equivalent to the well-known Hoover Index (HI). Make \( X(i) = Z(i) - Y(i) \) with \( X = Z - Y \). Because \( Z(i) / Z = DX(i) / Z + (1 - D)Y(i) / Z \), the expression in SI is reduced to \( Y(i) / Y - Z(i) / Z = (1 - D)(X(i) / X - Y(i) / Y) \). Summation over \( i \) of the absolute values of both sides gives \( SI = HI \). See Tamura (1988) for the application of this index to the Koreans’ residential distribution in Japan for the periods 1910-45 and 1950-85.
Incidentally, it is getting more and more difficult for Zainichi youth to find marriage partners within the community. For one thing, their circles of acquaintance tend to contain more Japanese than Zainichi Koreans. For another, they have no or a diluted sense of reluctance to marry Japanese, and elder generations are also realizing that objections based on nationalistic sentiments are of little use. Note here that marriages between Zainichi and “original” Koreans are also increasing, “original” being a self-mocking phrase for “native in the peninsula” frequently used among Zainichi youth.

Finally, table 5.8 informs us of the dwelling conditions, again of Koreans and Chinese. It shows a simple calculation, and we know that, in these 15 years, the number of persons per household has been decreasing from 3.3 to 2.6 in the case of Korean households, whereas the average number of household members have been a little more or fewer than 2 persons in the Chinese case.

The pace of decrease in the Koreans’ case can be considered as moving on the same trend line as national totals. In the Chinese case, however, the high proportion of single-person households might have been the main reason for their low averages. Unfortunately, figures concerning the lease-ownership distinction of dwelling sites are not classified according to nationalities. In view of the above observations, however, it may safely be said that the average Koreans’ dwelling conditions are not far away from those of the upper half of all foreigners.
Conclusions

"Long, long ago, when tigers were enjoying cigars . . ." is a hackneyed phrase with which Korean folktales begin. I started this chapter with the Zainichi Koreans’ history. At that time, tigers would have quit smoking.

When the South Korean government opened the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul, it had to import a mascot tiger from abroad. As I stressed above, the mid-1980s marked a turning point for Zainichi Koreans, and, at the time of the Seoul Olympics, the Zainichi population began to decline.

Discrimination by the Japanese against Koreans may be “invisible” to outside observers, as well as Japanese. It is very difficult to distinguish the two ethnically and culturally similar nations. Under the old registration system, Zainichi Koreans were “advised” to call themselves by Japanese-style names, which, to my sorrow and regret, was certainly a remnant of the So-shi Kai-mei (Chang-shi Kae-myung in Korean) policy that Japanese colonialists had forced on the people of Taiwan and Korea. This “advice” in turn made the problem all the more “invisible.” Even today, many Koreans in Japan prefer to use Tsumei (Japanese-style names) whenever they are afraid of discrimination. It was because of these kinds of invisible discrimination that I emphasized in this chapter the legal side of the problem.

In a 1988 essay, I closed by saying, “The highest barrier to be cleared is the fact that we lack reliable data other than population.”16 There has been little improvement in the situation since then. In this chapter, I again was forced to rely heavily on the census. Indeed, there have been many investigations into the actual conditions of Koreans in Japan, but they are “too much of one thing, and not enough of the other,” as the Japanese proverb puts it.17

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17. It says “Obi-ni mijikashi, tasuki-ni nagashi.” A typical example will be the Employment Security Bureau (1995), where assorted results for foreign workers were not released.
I admit that the findings in the previous section are not fruitful enough. Nonetheless, if I am allowed to pick up some new points, the “riddle” of the high unemployment rate of Koreans comes first, and their value on the Segregation Index next. I must ask the reader again to look forward to my next essay.

Finally, I close this chapter by touching on three topics that seem to help explain the present situation, irrespective of whether they are encouraging or not. First of all, Maihara-cho, a small town in Shiga Prefecture with 12,000 inhabitants, decided to give voting rights to foreign residents in a referendum on March 26, 2002, in balloting for and against amalgamation with neighboring local jurisdictions.

Although the referendum had no legal force with respect to the result, it was an encouraging event for Korean activists and Japanese supporters who have long been demanding the right to vote in the electoral assembly of local jurisdictions. With respect to this demand, the ruling political parties are divided, and the bill has not yet been presented to the Diet.

In the case of Maihara-cho, only 13 persons among the qualified 31 foreigners actually voted. Among the 13, absentee voting amounted to 6. This was because blackmailing letters were sent to the mayor, Toshio Muranishi, and even to the qualified foreigners. The mayor made house-to-house visits to persuade the foreign inhabitants not to be afraid of the threat.18

The Lawyers’ Association of Zainichi Koreans (LAZAK) was established in July 20, 2002, with 32 members. Historically, this must be a dream-come-true story for those like Kim Kyung Duke and others who had fought for a long time in the courts to qualify Zainichi Koreans who had passed their bar examinations for legal activities. It was reported that the aims of LAZAK were to protect the human rights of newcomers, to alleviate discrimination against Zainichi Koreans, and to promote the movement for the right to vote and participate in the performance of official duties. Except for quite a few local governments, the majority of local bodies have been rejecting foreigners seeking to become permanent staff.

Third, the basic stance of Japanese diplomats seems to have not shown any signs of change. The cruel treatment of a North Korean family by the staffs of the Consulate General in Shenyang, China, on May 8, 2002, sent shock waves among Japanese people. Personally, the news reminded me of the “homogeneity myth” syndrome.19

As of September 1997, only 10,241 Indo-Chinese refugees were permitted to reside in Japan. Of the boat people Japan temporarily admitted, 6,816 were deported to Australia, Canada, Norway, the United States, and other countries (the total number temporarily admitted is not available). In addition, during the period 1982-98, there were 1,651 applications for refugee designation, but merely 218 requests were authorized and 23 law-

19. See the first section above.
suits were filed. It is clearly because of these poor performances that the Japanese diplomats in Shenyang reacted to the refugees as they did.

It is true, as Gregory Clark suggests, that a more generous asylum policy is beneficial not only for refugees but also for the Japanese. As I think of the above examples together, however, their essence is neither a problem of asylum policy nor Japanese diplomatic principle. The more important thing is to look at what lies deep in the minds of ordinary Japanese. Beneath the reactions expressing reluctance or open antagonism to making Japanese society much more multicultural, there lies an obsessive sentiment that they do not want to face up to their own belief in the “myth” to be torn into pieces.

References


Toshiyuki Tamura’s chapter reveals many important facts about ethnic Koreans in Japan, particularly with regard to their history, their current social status, and their economic role in Japanese society. The chapter presents four main points:

1. The legal status of ethnic Koreans in Japanese society is not as high as it should be.
2. The informal social status of ethnic Koreans suffers from much invisible prejudice in Japanese society.
3. The major occupational areas of ethnic Koreans in Japan include service businesses, owner-managed small businesses, and marketing businesses.
4. The unemployment rate of ethnic Koreans is much higher than that of any other ethnic community in Japan.

Tamura does not give a detailed analysis of the above findings because of a lack of data or official information. However, intellectuals in the two countries have long known that there are other perceived reasons that ethnic Koreans in Japan have such an unequal status, in addition to historical antagonism.

First, some perceive ethnic Koreans in Japan to be too aggressive, tough, and prone to troublemaking. The Y.H. Industrial Company incident in the late 1970s, the case of war-comfort women, troubles related to history textbooks, the opposition movement against the Yaskuni Shinsha, and so on—these events involving ethnic Koreans are enough to leave ordinary Japanese with strongly negative perceptions of ethnic Koreans.

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1. The first overt manifestation of workers’ discontent appeared in August 1979 with demonstrations by 200 women employees of the Y.H. Industrial Company, which had just gone bankrupt.
Second, the ethnic Korean workforce in Japan happens to be mainly concentrated in such risky service businesses as Pachinko,\(^2\) gambling, and related businesses. Third, the endless conflict between the Mindan (ethnic Koreans who support South Korea) and the Jochongryun (ethnic Koreans who support North Korea) often causes instability and discomfort in Japanese society.

Fourth, there is a notion in Japanese society that South Korea as a nation and the ethnic Korean community in Japan are two different entities. That is, the Japanese view South Korea as a respectable and highly recognized partner—as has been demonstrated by the two countries’ successfully cohosting the World Cup, Korea’s rapid growth in information technology industries, and Korea’s hosting of the Asian Games. Yet on the contrary, the Japanese tend to view ethnic Koreans in Japan as a group of people who left Korea for a number of different and complicated reasons.

Despite the above-mentioned dark-side stories, the business connection between South Korea and ethnic Koreans in Japan has been quite impressive during the past four decades. Quite a few Japanese businesses run by ethnic Koreans have invested heavily in Korea, and many of them have been rather successful there. Examples include Lotte, Kolon, Shindorico, and Shinhan Bank.

These successful businesses still are deepening their roots in the Korean economy. Also, their contribution to South Korean economic development, particularly in its earlier stages, has also been of enormous value.

Today’s ethnic Koreans in Japan may still be viewed by some as aggressive, tough, overly egoistic, and so on. Nevertheless, as the Japanese economy becomes more globalized, open, and outward looking, I am sure that ethnic Koreans in Japan will work for Japan first, and perhaps for South Korea afterward, to make the economy more competitive and dynamic.

\(^2\) Pachinko is a combination of slot machine and pinball.