



# Rethinking Financial Stability

Markus Brunnermeier

discussing Aikman, Haldane, Hinterschweiger, Kapadia

# ■ A quick take on the paper

- Great overview of current regulatory framework
- Covers many corners, comprehensive and detailed
- My focus: “Shift in thinking about
  - Financial stability
  - Managing the macro-economy
  - Linkages between financial stability and monetary policy”

# From ... to

1. From “Stock/Flow focus” to “Risk focus”  
“Paradox of Prudence”
2. From “Risk in isolation” to “risk in spillovers”
3. From contemporaneous risk to hidden build-up of risk  
“Volatility Paradox”
4. From Separation principle to linkage between  
MacroPru & MoPo  
“Stealth recapitalization” through redistributive MoPo
5. Stability vs. Resilience

# 1. *From Stock/Flows to Risk Focus*

- From log-linearization (kills risk terms) to **Volatility Dynamics**
  - From one-time shocks to endogenously time-varying volatility
  - Precautionary savings
  - Flight to safety with serious portfolio choice

# 1. *From Stock/Flows to Risk Focus*

- From log-linearization (kills risk terms) to **Volatility Dynamics**
  - From one-time shocks to endogenously time-varying volatility
  - Precautionary savings
  - Flight to safety with serious portfolio choice

## ■ Fallacy of Composition in Risk Space

### 1. **Keynes' Paradox of Thrift**

### 2. **"Paradox of Prudence"** Brunnermeier & Sannikov (Handbook chapter 2017)

- Each institution tries to reduce risk exposure (micro-prudent)
- Increases endogenous (systemic) risk (macro-imprudent)
  - Liquidity spirals, fire-sales,...
  - Disinflationary spirals, ...


## 2. From Risk in Isolation to Spillovers

■ Direct contractual: domino effect – *network*

- Network effects

- Bankruptcy of bank A leads to default of B
  - 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup> round effects
  - Random recovery rate
- Data implications:

- Position data
- High frequency
- High granularity




## 2. From Risk in Isolation to Spillovers

- Direct contractual: domino effect – *cross-section*


- Network effects

- Bankruptcy of bank A leads to default of B
  - 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup> round effects
  - Random recovery rate



- Indirect

- Price effects (fire-sale externalities), *liquidity spirals*





- Adverse GE response → Response Indicator (LMI)

# “Response indicator”

■ Shock absorber

■ Shock amplifier




Direct	Indirect
Contractual links	“Virtual links”
Loss through bankruptcy/default	Similar exposure than other levered players
Position data	<b>Response indicator</b> - expectations/ constraints




### 3. From cont. risk to Hidden Build-up of Risk

- Systemic **risk build-up** during (credit) bubble  
... and materializes in a crisis – *time-series*
- “**Volatility Paradox**”      contemp. measures inappropriate
- Low VaR       $\Rightarrow$  low margins       $\Rightarrow$  high margins  $\Rightarrow$  high leverage  
                  $\Rightarrow$  low risk-weights  $\Rightarrow$  less capital       $\Rightarrow$  high leverage
- Shock leads to large adjustment
- High VaR       $\Rightarrow$  ...
- **Procyclicality**
  - Countercyclical puffer... See paper
- More subtle: better idiosyncratic risk sharing higher endogenous risk


# Before Build-up




# After Build-up



# Shock after Build-up: Amplification



# Shock after Build-up: Multiplicity



Non-linearity


## 4. From Separation to Links: MacroPru & MoPo

- In EME many MacroPru measures are MoPo measures
- Inside money creation by regulated banks
  - Outside money and inside money are not perfect substitutes
  - In down turns, simply replacing “missing” inside money with outside money is not sufficient.  
“monetarists’ view is not sufficient”
    - Inside money allows banks to diversify idiosyncratic risk
    - Outside money doesn’t
- Central bank balance sheet
  - Reserve holding due to liquidity regulation (LCR)

affects money demand

Monetarists’ supply view  
is not sufficient

# Redistributive MoPo: “I Theory of Money”



- Adverse shock → Liquidity & Deflationary Spirals
- Monetary policy
  - Interest rate cut ⇒ long-term bond price ↑
  - Asset purchase ⇒ asset price ↑
  - ⇒ “stealth recapitalization” - redistributive
  - ⇒ risk premia ↓
- Liquidity & Deflationary Spirals are mitigated


MoPo with risk premium focus

# 5. Volatility vs. Resilience

## ■ Difference


- Low risk/  
volatility

concrete  
wall



- Resilience  
mean-reversion

rubber  
wall




“Steh-auf Männchen”  
„little get-up man”




# Resilience & Growth-stability Trade-off

- Growth vs. risk/uncertainty **with resilience**




# Resilience & Growth-stability Trade-off

- Growth vs. risk/uncertainty **with resilience**



# Resilience & Growth-stability Trade-off


- Growth vs. risk/uncertainty **with resilience**



- In the long-run average **growth matters**, **risk** (with resilience) is only of **second order** importance
  - Lucas: Macroeconomics should focus on growth theory rather than business cycles


# Resilience & Growth-stability Trade-off

- Growth vs. risk/uncertainty **without resilience**




# Resilience & Growth-stability Trade-off

- Growth vs. risk/uncertainty **without resilience**



# Resilience & Growth-stability Trade-off

- Growth vs. risk/uncertainty **without resilience**



- NOTE: Do Financial Crises destroy resiliency!
  - Permanent decline in growth rates
- Affects Trade-off Theory:  
Reduction in output vs. reduction in crisis probability

# From ... to

1. From “Stock/Flow focus”  
“Paradox of Prudence” to “Risk focus”
2. From “Risk in isolation” to “risk in spillovers”
3. From contemporaneous risk  
“Volatility Paradox” to hidden build-up of risk
4. From Separation principle to linkage between  
MacroPru & MoPo  
“Stealth recapitalization” through redistributive MoPo
5. Stability vs. Resilience