

Case Studies in Economic Sanctions and Terrorism

Case 89-3

US v. Sudan (1989– : *Human Rights; Civil War; Democracy*)

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Chronology of Key Events

- 1983 Civil war breaks out between government forces, insurgents of Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), which receives some assistance from Ethiopia, Cuba. SPLA, composed mostly of non-Moslems from southern part of country, opposes government efforts to impose Islamic law (sharia) over whole country. (*National Journal*, 10 December 1988, 3130; *Congressional Quarterly Weekly*, 13 May 1989, 1132-35)
- 1988 Both sides in civil war are "accused of using food as a weapon, creating a war-induced famine that [leaves] an estimated 250,000 dead" in 1988, threatens as many as 500,000 in 1989. (*Congressional Quarterly Weekly*, 13 May 1989, 1132; *Washington Post*, 1 July 1989, A12)
- December 1988 US economic, military aid disbursements to Sudan (except for food aid) are frozen because of Sudan's failure for over a year to make \$12 million in payments on its debt to US. (*Congressional Quarterly Weekly*, 13 May 1989, 1135)
- Early March 1989 Under pressure from military, which is concerned about recent setbacks, rising costs of civil war, Prime Minister Mahdi forms new government that excludes fundamentalist National Islamic Front (NIF). NIF has recently blocked consideration of peace proposal because it would have prevented full implementation of Islamic laws in Sudan. (*Washington Post*, 4 March 1988, A18; *Congressional Quarterly Weekly*, 13 May 1989, 1135)
- March 1989 After US administration requests \$52 million for Sudan for FY 1990, Congress passes nonbinding resolution, offered by Congressman Gary L. Ackerman (D-NY), Sen. Edward M.

Kennedy (D-MA), calling on President George Bush to reconsider extending nonhumanitarian aid to Sudan unless government makes progress in delivering food aid to refugees, negotiating end to civil war. Of total requested, only \$10 million in economic support funds, \$5 million in military assistance would be affected. Resolution is later attached as amendment to foreign assistance appropriation bill. (*Congressional Quarterly Weekly*, 13 May 1989, 1133)

30 June 1989

In bloodless coup, group of officers led by Brig. Gen. Omar Hassan Ahmed Bashir overthrows civilian government of Prime Minister Mahdi. US administration reacts cautiously, expressing regret that democratically elected government has been militarily overthrown; one observer notes that Mahdi "just wasn't effective in ending the war or making the economy work. The new leaders have said they intend to make peace in the south. I think everyone is waiting to see if they deliver." (*Keesing's* 36728; *Washington Post*, 9 July 1989, A22; *New York Times*, 16 July 1989, 4)

5 July 1989

Bashir announces that peace talks with SPLA will be held in Ethiopia in August. (*Keesing's* 37114)

5 December 1989

In Nairobi, second round of talks between Sudan government, SPLA break down when Bashir's government refuses to compromise on application of sharia. Bashir government begins enforcing harsh penalties under sharia, including amputations for stealing; cracks down on dissent, even imposing death penalty against civilian opponents; bans food relief shipments to rebel-held areas in south. (*Keesing's* 37114; *Facts on File*, 1990, 23)

28 February 1990

US Agency for International Development announces that no nonhumanitarian aid may be disbursed to Sudan because of amendment to Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act of 1989 barring aid to countries in which democratically elected government has been deposed in military coup (see "Legal Notes"). Amendment, section 513 of act, has been included in every foreign aid appropriation bill passed since 1986. (*New York Times*, 16 July 1989, 4; *Congressional Quarterly Weekly*, 13 May 1989, 1135; *Washington Post*, 24 May 1990, A48)

28 March 1990

Human Rights Watch describes Sudan as "a human rights disaster," with dramatic increases in human rights violations in northern Sudan (in particular, violations against the non-Muslim ethnic groups as part of an effort to "Islamicize" the country) under the Bashir regime. (*Keesing's* 37367; *Europa World Yearbook 1997*, 3064; Banks, Day, and Muller 1997, 796)

- April 1990 Bashir defeats attempted coup, executes 28 military officers within 24 hours of coup attempt, intensifies campaign to suppress dissent. (*Washington Post*, 24 May 1990, A45)
- 1990 European Community, citing the Sudanese government's human rights abuses, freezes non humanitarian assistance to Sudan. (Agence France Presse, 8 February 1993; Inter Press Service, 19 January 1994; Agence France Presse, 16 October 1996)
- Fall 1990 A devastating famine hits Sudan. Relief efforts are hampered due to Sudan's support of Iraq in the Persian Gulf crisis. Chairman of the House Select Committee on Hunger Tony Hall (D-OH) remarks, "I can't sit here and say we will deny innocent people food, but I can say it will be damn sight more difficult persuading the general public to provide aid for these people." (*Washington Post*, 6 October 1990, A22)
- November 1990 In the FY 1991 foreign aid appropriations bill, Congress prohibits the provision of International Military Education Training and Foreign Military Financing funds to Sudan. (CRS 1992, 94)
- 25 April 1991 Because of insufficient protection of workers' rights, President Bush suspends GSP benefits for Sudan. (CRS 1992, 94)
- Winter 1991 The Sudanese government remains highly suspicious of aid agencies volunteering help with the famine crisis. The European Community states its members are "shocked and dismayed at the government of Sudan's continued failure... to cooperate with donors and non-governmental organizations in implementing measures to ensure that emergency supplies reach the needy populations in time." By the end of February, the Sudanese government agrees that the crisis will require a large-scale intervention; however, relations between Khartoum and aid organizations remain strained, relief groups have difficulty reaching needy people in time. (*Keesing's* 37995; *Economist*, 19 January 1991, 36; *Washington Post*, 14 April 1991, A18)
- December 1993 United Nations General Assembly passes resolution, with only Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Cuba and Burma voting against, condemning Sudan for human rights abuses. Sudan and the United Kingdom expel ambassadors after Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. George Carey, changes his travel itinerary, visiting the SPLA south instead of Khartoum. (*Europa World Yearbook 1997*, 3065; *Christian Science Monitor*, 24 March 1993, 3)

- 1 April 1994 US Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright visits Sudan, criticizes the government's conduct of the civil war and obstruction of delivery of relief aid to the south; warns that unless Sudan's human rights situation improves, the country will face "international isolation." (*Europa World Yearbook 1997*, 3065)
- September 1994 Two years of peace talks over Sudan's long-time civil war break down when the two sides "adopt irreconcilable positions on southern self-determination and the relationship between state and religion." (Banks, Day, and Muller 1997, 795)
- June 1995 Northern opposition parties ally with the SPLA (also known as SPLM, Sudan People's Liberation Movement), forming an anti-government alliance, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). The alliance will allow other Arab states, particularly Egypt, to put pressure on Khartoum without directly supporting the non-Moslem southerners, whose succession to power all Arab states oppose. (*International Herald Tribune*, 5 February 1997, A1; *Financial Times*, 24 January 1997, 4)
- 11 November 1996 The Clinton Administration plans to send \$20 million in surplus US military equipment to Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda, countries that support Sudanese opposition groups in the civil war. US officials insist that all of the military aid will be nonlethal, such as radios, uniforms, boots and tents. (*International Herald Tribune*, 11 November 1996, 1)
- 11 June 1997 The Freedom From Religious Persecution Act, HR 1685, sponsored by Rep. Frank Wolf (R-VA), is introduced in the Congress calling for sanctions against countries where religious persecution is found to exist. The bill singles out Sudan and calls for immediate and comprehensive sanctions on the country. Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) introduces parallel legislation in the Senate. (*Journal of Commerce*, 11 June 1997, 2A; 143 *Congressional Record*, H 5129; *Wall Street Journal*, 7 July 1997, A20)
- 4 November 1997 President Clinton, seeking to stave off harsher congressional action, imposes broad sanctions against Sudan by executive order. The action blocks all Sudanese assets in the United States and bars all trade as well as a wide range of financial transactions with Sudan. Exceptions will be made for areas considered key for US national interest; the president mentions the import of gum arabic, a key ingredient in candy among other products, as a possible exemption. State Department spokesman James Rubin states the administration prefers its own sanctions to legislated versions since legislated

sanctions “normally lack flexibility.” Furthermore, the action may be an attempt to prevent sanctions on Syria. (*New York Times*, 5 November 1997, A7; USIS, 4 November 1997)

- 18 February 1998 The Sudanese Islamic Party enacts a new constitution. Proponents of the new constitution claim that it will allow party politics and greater political freedom. The opposition dismisses these changes as ruse to get western donors to resume their foreign aid to Sudan. (*New York Times*, 18 February 1998, A3)
- 2 May 1998 The US asks the Sudanese government to lift its restrictions on the distribution of food and medicine in Southern Sudan and provides \$9.2 million of food assistance to the southern region, in danger of starvation. (*New York Times*, 3 May 1998, 6; USIS, 1 May 1998)
- 8 May 1998 The House Ways and Means Committee deletes provisions in the Religious Persecution Act which codify sanctions against Sudan—currently imposed by an executive order—and broadens exemptions for Sudanese imports of gum arabic into the United States. Sanctions against Sudan allow for imports of gum arabic until six months after the completion of delivery contracts for 1998. (*Inside US Trade*, 8 May 1998, 28)
- June 1998 After gradually easing restraints, the Sudanese government opens the entire country to new foreign aid. (*Washington Post*, 7 July 1998, 1)
- 30 June 1998 President Bashir signs the new constitution. However in the wake of a bombing in Khartoum, Bashir suspends political liberalization. (*Washington Post*, 3 December 1998, A35; *Dow Jones*, 2 December 1998)
- July 1998 Sudanese government and the southern rebels reach a cease-fire for the famine-ridden southwest region of Bahr el Ghazal that will last until 15 January. (*New York Times*, 16 January 1999, A4; *Washington Post*, 14 January 1999, A18)
- 8 July 1998 The US Agency for International Development (USAID) announces that it will facilitate the allocation of an additional \$19.5 million in famine relief for Southern Sudan. The additional funds bring the total US support for the region to more than \$75 million. (USIS, 8 July 1998; *Washington Post*, 7 July 1998, 1)
- Late September 1998 Two Sudanese diplomats reportedly hold private discussions with State Department officials. They are told that Sudan must stop supporting terrorism, halt production of chemical weapons, and end the war in the south to normalize relations with the US.

Meanwhile, Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail declares that the Sudanese do not want confrontation with the US and are prepared for a “constructive dialogue” with the US on issues of conflict. (*Washington Post*, 30 October 1998, A35)

January 1999

According to Switzerland-based Christian Solidarity International, it has paid \$50 per person to buy the freedom of 1,050 slaves in Sudan this month. (*Washington Post*, 29 January 1999, A20)

15 January 1999

Sudanese government and southern rebels renew their cease-fire for three more months in Bahr el Ghazal. (*New York Times*, 16 January 1999, A4)

23 March 1999

An official with the US Agency for International Development tells Congress that the US has given more than \$130 million in humanitarian aid to Sudan so far in 1999, bringing the total amount disbursed since 1989 to \$750 million. (USIS, 23 March 1999)

23 April 1999

US criticizes the United Nation Commission on Human Rights for leaving the word “slavery” out of a resolution passed on Sudan. The US also hammers the UNCHR for not describing harshly enough the human rights violations of Sudan. (USIS, 23 April 1999)

28 April 1999

President Clinton announces that the US government in the future will follow a policy of usually exempting exports of agricultural goods, medicine and medical equipment from unilateral sanctions. This policy will also apply to existing sanctions cases. Under Secretary of State Stuart Eizenstat explains that approval of exports to countries under US sanctions will occur on a case-by-case basis. Specific licensing rules will be drawn up for each country. Sales will have to be at market price, and cannot be earmarked to the “coercive organs” of the foreign government. National security considerations could also preclude sales, such as if the US or an ally is at war with a foreign country or if US exports would be channeled to specific recipients such as supporters of a given regime. No US financing will be allowed for the sales. The policy change could heavily affect Sudan, which will now presumably be able to receive American food and medical exports once the regulations are drawn up. (USIS, 28 April 1999; 28 April 1999; *Journal of Commerce*, 4 May 1999, 8A)

18 May 1999

US government condemns Sudanese government bombing attacks on two towns in Bahr el-Ghazal, which kill at least one individual. The US maintains that the bombings violate the cease-fire in the region between the government and secessionist rebels. (USIS, 18 May 1999)

- 13 December 1999 In an attempt to ward off political challenges from the parliamentary speaker Hassan Turabi, Sudanese President Omar el-Bashir declares a 3-month state of emergency and suspends parliament. A month later, el-Bashir consolidates power by removing ten of 25 cabinet ministers and dismissing all state governors. (*New York Times*, 13 December 1999; *Financial Times*, 14 December 1999; *Washington Post*, 25 January 2000)
- October 2000 Congress enacts the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act, which permanently exempts food and medicine exports from sanctions regimes. (CRS 2005, 11)
- November 2000 Citing Sudan's "virtual monopoly on the world's supply of the highest grade of gum Arabic," Congress pushes for its exemption from the comprehensive trade restrictions with Sudan. (CRS 2005, 12)
- September 2001 Facing pressure from the White House, Republican House leaders pull the Sudan Peace Act from the floor. This legislation would increase US assistance to the opposition SPLA and potentially punish companies doing business in Sudan. (*Financial Times*, 27 September 2001, 5)
- November 2001 Current and former residents of Sudan file a \$1 billion class action lawsuit against Talisman Energy under the Alien Tort Claims Act in US federal court. The plaintiffs allege that Talisman, through its oil operations in Sudan, collaborated with the Government of Sudan to commit extrajudicial killings, war crimes, forcible displacement, rape, kidnapping and enslavement. Talisman subsequently disposes of its operations in Sudan. The case drags on for five years without reaching a decision. (Hufbauer and Mitrokostas 2003, 70; Talisman Energy 2005 Corporate Responsibility Report, 11; *Financial Times*, 9 November 2001, 6)
- 26 April 2002 After two trips to Sudan, US Envoy for Peace John Danforth reports his findings to the White House. His recommendations include a plan whereby the Government of Sudan would share oil revenues with rebels and accept international monitoring of religious freedom as part of a "just peace." Danforth also concludes that the North-South war is un-winnable by either side, and that the US should continue to act as an intermediary. (*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 28 April 2002, A4; *New York Times*, 14 May 2002)
- 20 July 2002 Government of Sudan and the SPLA sign the Machakos Protocol after talks in Kenya. This accord addresses the role of state and

religion and the right of southern Sudan to self-determination. Though the accord sets a framework for future negotiations, no ceasefire is reached. (State Department background note on Sudan, www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5424.htm; Agence France Presse, 22 July 2002)

21 October 2002

President Bush signs the Sudan Peace Act, which commits the Administration to make semi-annual reports to Congress as to whether “the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement are negotiating in good faith and that negotiations should continue.” If the President cannot make this determination, he must instruct US executive directors of international financial institutions to continue voting against loans, credits and guarantees for Sudan; to consider downgrading diplomatic relations; to take all possible steps to deny oil revenues to Sudan; and to seek a UN Security Council resolution to impose an arms embargo against Sudan. A House version of the bill had included provisions for capital market sanctions on Sudan; the Senate’s deletion of this portion of the legislation was controversial. “A broad coalition, ranging from the Christian right to the Congressional Black Caucus, back the capital market sanctions...But business groups believe the sanctions provisions will set a new precedent for using access to US capital market to enforce a variety of political objectives.” (CRS 2005, 15; *International Trade Reporter*, 17 October 2002, volume 19, no. 41; *Inside US Trade*, 14 June 2002, 8)

Spring 2003

Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM; also known as Sudan Liberation Army, SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) join forces in Darfur and challenge the Government of Sudan, accusing the Government of systematic discrimination against African ethnic groups. The Government dismisses the SLM and JEM as terrorist groups, and begins a scorched earth campaign, encouraging the Janjaweed (Government-supported Arab militias) to target civilian populations suspected of supporting the SLM fighters. Tens of thousands will eventually die and roughly 2 million will be displaced from their homes. (CRS 2005, 2; ICG; State Department background note on Sudan, www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5424.htm)

August 2003

Darfur conflict escalates between SLM and Government of Sudan. Government bombing raids force more than 65,000 Sudanese refugees to neighboring Chad. (*Financial Times*, 4 June 2004, 3)

September 2003

During talks held in Chad, Government of Sudan and SLM agree to a ceasefire in Darfur. (*Financial Times*, 4 June 2004, 3)

- September 2003 On 9 September, President Bush imposes sanctions on half a dozen countries, including Sudan, for failing to meet minimum human rights standards set out in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000. Later in the month, Bush moves Sudan from Tier 3 (sanctionable) to Tier 2 (watchlist) status due to significant steps taken by the Sudan Government to fight trafficking. (CRS 2005, 13)
- 8 April 2004 SLM, JEM and the Government of Sudan sign a ceasefire agreement, with an African Union Military Mission sent to monitor its implementation. (State Department background note on Sudan, www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5424.htm)
- 18 May 2004 State Department removes Sudan from a list of countries considered “noncooperative” in the war against terrorism. Soon thereafter, Secretary of State Colin Powell declares that normalizing relations with Sudan is contingent on resolution of the Darfur situation. (CRS 2006, 13)
- May 2004 “UN warns that the situation is the worst humanitarian disaster facing the world today. International Crisis Group estimates about 30,000 people have died. Up to one million people have been displaced with about 120,000 refugees in Chad, and an additional 350,000 are at risk from starvation and disease. US and other UN Security Council members put pressure on the Sudan Government to end the fighting and to lift restrictions on humanitarian access. (*Financial Times*, 4 June 2004, 3)
- Early July 2004 US Secretary of State Colin Powell and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan visit Sudan during the same week. Both men deliver stern warnings for the Government of Sudan to resolve the Darfur crisis. In a joint communiqué with the UN, Sudan promises to immediately disarm the Janjaweed militias. (*New York Times*, 1 July 2004, A1; *Washington Post*, 4 July 2004, A19)
- 9 September 2004 Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Colin Powell testifies that “genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bear responsibility—and genocide may still be occurring.” (CRS 2005, 1)
- October 2004 After breaches of the April 2004 ceasefire, the African Union increases its monitoring and observer force. (State Department background note on Sudan, www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5424.htm)
- 9 November 2004 Government of Sudan, SLM and JEM sign two agreements in Nigeria: the Agreement for Enhancing of the Security Situation in Darfur and the Agreement on Humanitarian Situation. The parties

commit to reveal the location of their forces to the African Union, and the Government of Sudan agrees to disarm the Janjaweed. (CRS 2006, 5; *Washington Post*, 10 November 2004, A1; *New York Times*, 11 November 2004, 9)

December 2004

National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD) and the Government of Sudan sign a peace agreement in Chad, and a month later the parties agree to begin helping refugees return to Darfur from Chad. The NMRD is an armed group in the Darfur region; its members are said to have been assisted by the Chad Government. (CRS 2006, 3)

23 December 2004

President Bush signs the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act, which amends the Sudan Peace Act to allow the President to provide funds “to support the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement that applies to all regions of Sudan, including the Darfur regions” and “to address the humanitarian and human rights crisis in the Darfur region and eastern Chad.” (CRS 2005, 16; White House press release, 23 December 2004)

2005

In an effort to make aid available and promote commerce, Congress passes legislation—the Assistance for International Malaria Control Act; and the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act—in an attempt to distinguish between the Government of Sudan, the people of Sudan, and the areas of the country outside government control. (CRS 2005, 13, 14)

9 January 2005

Government of Sudan and the SPLM (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement; also known as SPLA) sign the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which officially ends a 21 year-old civil war by providing for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of troops from southern Sudan, and the repatriation and resettlement of refugees. Under the accord, sharia will apply in the north but not the south. After a six-year interim period of self-rule, the south will hold a referendum to decide whether to remain part of Sudan or secede. (State Department background note on Sudan, www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5424.htm; *Washington Post*, 10 January 2005, A9)

24 March 2005

UN Security Council Resolution 1590 establishes the UN Mission in Sudan, providing for an initial six month period with 10,000 military personnel and up to 715 civilian police personnel. This Mission will partner with the African Union to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, facilitate the return of refugees and provide humanitarian assistance. (State Department background note on Sudan, www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5424.htm)

- 29 March 2005 UN Security Council Resolution 1591 imposes sanctions on Sudan, requiring UN member states to “freeze all funds, financial assets and economic resources” on individuals who “impede the peace process, constitute a threat to the stability in Darfur and the region, commit violations of international humanitarian or human rights law or other atrocities”, or violate the arms embargo in Resolution 1556. However, the sanctions do not take effect for 30 days, which allows ample time for those targeted to safeguard their assets. (CRS 2005, 6; State Department background note on Sudan, www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5424.htm)
- 31 March 2005 UN Security Council Resolution 1593 refers the situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. (CRS 2005, 6; State Department background note on Sudan, www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5424.htm)
- 9 July 2005 Government of Sudan and SPLM ratify the Interim National Constitution (INC), which declares Sudan to be “a democratic, decentralized, multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multi-lingual State.” (CRS 2006, 8; State Department background note on Sudan, www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5424.htm)
- 30 July 2005 First Vice President and Chairman of the SPLM, Dr. John Garang, dies in a plane crash in southern Sudan. (CRS 2006, 9)
- September 2005 In the first major ceasefire violation in over a year, SLM and Government of Sudan forces collide in Darfur. (CRS 2006, 3)
- 10 March 2006 After securing the permission of the Government of Sudan, the African Union agrees to transfer its Darfur mission to the United Nations if a peace deal is reached. (*Financial Times*, 13 March 2006, 5)
- 14 April 2006 Chad President Idriss Deby announces he will cut diplomatic ties with Sudan. This comes a day after Chad troops fought off an insurgent attack in N’Djamena, which Deby claims was backed by Sudan. Deby later threatens to expel the Sudanese refugees living in Chad. (*Financial Times*, 15 April 2006, 7; *Washington Post*, 18 April 2006, A16; Agence France Presse; 19 April 2006)
- 25 April 2006 UN Security Council imposes a travel ban and orders the freezing of assets of a senior Sudanese air force officer and three other Sudanese nationals accused of war crimes and impeding the peace process in Darfur. (*Washington Post*, 26 April 2006, A26)

- 26 April 2006 Sudan rejects a US-backed plan to send 15,000 UN and NATO troops to replace the 6,000 person African Union force. (*Washington Post*, 27 April 2006, A21)
- 5 May 2006 The government and the Sudan Liberation Army sign a peace agreement. The African Union threatens to impose sanctions on two rebel factions that refuse to endorse the pact unless they do not sign by May 31. (*Washington Post*, 17 May 2006, A18)
- 15 May 2006 Sudan's foreign affairs minister restates his government's objection to transferring the African Union's peacekeeping mandate to the United Nations. (*BBC Monitoring Newsfile*, 15 May 2006)
- 17 May 2006 The UN Security Council unanimously adopts a resolution mandating United Nations peacekeepers to replace the African Union mission if Sudan's government consents. (*Washington Post*, 17 May 2006, A18)
- May 2006 Two of the main rebel factions fight one another in Darfur, dividing along ethnic lines and seeking to capture more territory. The fighting threatens to doom the May 5 peace accord. (*International Herald Tribune*, 20 May 2006, 1)
- July 2006 The Sudanese military attacks splinter factions of the SLA, disguising its aircraft as relief helicopters. The fighting results in indiscriminate killings, rape, looting and the displacement of some 8,000 civilians in a period of only ten days. (*Reuters*, 12 July 2006)
- 13 October 2006 The US Congress passes and the President signs the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act, which blocks property of, and prohibits transactions with, Sudan's government. President Bush issues Executive Order 13412 to implement certain provisions of the legislation. Similar prohibitions were already implemented by Executive Order 13067, issued by President Clinton in 1997, and UN Security Council Resolution 1591, passed in March 2005. The new legislation eases sanctions against areas of southern Sudan, provided that transactions don't involve the Sudanese government. (*Mondaq Business Briefing*, 25 March 2007)
- 31 August 2006 The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1706, which will deploy a peacekeeping mission of 17,500 troops if the Sudanese government consents. President Omar al-Bashir prepares a new offensive against rebel splinter factions. (*Calgary Herald*, 2 September 2006, A16)

- December 2006 The African Union warns that the Janjaweed militias are resurgent, causing the Darfur situation to rapidly deteriorate. The Sudanese government continues to prevent UN peacekeepers from entering the country, despite the threat of sanctions from the United States and its allies. (*Washington Post*, 17 December 2006, A31)
- 12 January 2007 President Bashir and leaders of several rebel groups, including the Justice and Equality Movement and a SLA splinter faction, sign a 60-day cease-fire negotiated by New Mexico's governor, Bill Richardson. (*International Herald Tribune*, 12 January 2007, 4)
- 8 February 2007 Sudan's Foreign Ministry rejects the threat of US sanctions as "an unjustifiable development... which confirms the persistence of the United States in their policy of confrontation." Sudan does not consent to the deployment of UN forces in Darfur. (*Agence France Presse*, 8 February 2007)
- 14 March 2007 The United Nations reports that more than 78,500 people fled their homes in Darfur in January and February. Government and Janjaweed attacks triggered almost half of the displacement, followed by intertribal conflicts (more than one-third) and increasing violence by the government-aligned SLA (about one-fifth). (*Associated Press Newswires*, 14 March 2007)
- March 2007 British Prime Minister Tony Blair and German Chancellor Angela Merkel suggest expanding UN sanctions against Sudan. The United States considers imposing sanctions against companies doing business in Sudan. (*Washington Post*, 15 March 2007, A16; 26 March 2007, A12)
- 29 March 2007 President Bashir continues to refuse UN peacekeepers, arguing that outsiders would stir up more violence. (*New York Times*, 29 March 2007, 5)
- June-July 2007 In July, UN Security Council Resolution 1769 authorizes the deployment of a joint African Union/United Nations peacekeeping force in Darfur. The deployment follows an agreement reached in Addis Abba, Ethiopia, in June, in which Sudan's government is to allow the "hybrid" force into the region. There are expected to be around 17,000 troops and 3,000 policemen. Concerning the force's mission, there are different views as to which organization will be the main player, with the United States and others viewing it as primarily a UN mission and Sudan viewing it as primarily an African Union mission. The troops will not be deployed before next spring. (*Economist*, 14 July 2007; [CRS 2011](#), 14;

- October 2007 An estimated 2.1 to 2.5 million Darfuris are estimated to live in camps and an estimated 300,000 Darfuris have fled the country to Chad and the Central African Republic. Additionally, there are estimated to be over a million Darfuris who are not accounted for because of seasonal migration. ([Economist](#), 25 October 2007)
- November 2007 A peace conference in Libya attended by northern and southern groups, as well as special envoys from the European Union, Britain, China, and the United States, among others countries, breaks down. Major rebel groups with influence on the ground were not in attendance. ([Economist](#), 1 November 2007)
- December 2007 Under UNSCR 1769, the United Nations assumes control over African Union forces in Darfur to create a joint task force. With a planned 26,000 troops, the United Nations/African Union peacekeeping force will be the world's largest, with authorization to take all necessary measures to protect its personnel and humanitarian workers. ([CRS 2011](#), 14; [Economist](#), 3 June 2008; [Brisbane Times](#), 1 January 2008)
- May 2008 Sixty UN peacekeepers are ambushed and disarmed in Darfur. This is an assault led by Darfuri rebels on the city of Khartoum. ([Financial Times](#), 26 May 2008; [Financial Times](#), 25 May 2008)
- Fighting erupts in the Abyei region of Sudan in mid-May. Northern and southern forces clashed with machine guns and mortar fire, and tens of thousands of the town's residents are forced to flee. Approximately 100,000 people are displaced as a result of this fighting. ([Washington Post](#), 2 June 2008; [Economist](#), 22 May 2008)
- June 2008 International Criminal Court chief prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo charges "the whole state apparatus" of Sudan for implication in crimes in Darfur. Sudan's ambassador to the United Nations responds to allegations that Sudan's government is involved in crimes against humanity by stating that the allegations are "fictitious and vicious." ([Washington Post](#), 4 June 2008)
- July 2008 The International Criminal Court indicts Omar al-Bashir, Sudan's president, for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Additionally, the Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo asks ICC judges to issue an arrest warrant for Bashir. The charges relate to actions committed in the Darfur region. This is both the first time the Court has sought action against a sitting head of state and has sought an indictment for the charge of genocide. ([Economist](#),

17 July 2008; [Financial Times](#), 15 July 2008; [CRS 2011](#), Summary)

December 2008

Sadiq al Mahdi, a well-known opposition politician in Sudan, argues that a mixed court in Sudan composed of Sudanese and international members could be established to try Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir for war crimes and genocide. This “third way” is seen as a preferable alternative to the options of trying Bashir for crimes at the ICC in the Hague—with possible negative consequences for Sudan—or doing nothing. ([Economist](#), 11 December 2008)

March 2009

J. Scott Gration is appointed US Special Envoy to Sudan by President Obama. The appointment comes in the context of a deteriorating situation in Darfur, after the government of Sudan expelled 13 aid groups. It is estimated that 200,000 people have died as a result of the crisis in Darfur. ([Reuters](#), 17 March 2009)

The ICC issues an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur, but not genocide, saying the standard of proof for the evidence at the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber had not been met. In response, a presidential advisor to the government in Khartoum refers to the court as a “mechanism of neocolonialist policy”, China expresses opposition to the arrest warrant, and the African Union argues that it will compromise the possibility of peace in Sudan. ([Amnesty International](#), 3 February 2010; [Financial Times](#), 9 March 2009; [Financial Times](#), 15 July 2008; [CRS 2011](#), Summary, 10)

In response to the ICC’s issuance of an arrest warrant for President Bashir, Sudan expels 13 international humanitarian aid organizations and closes three national aid organizations affiliated with the United States and the United Nations. According to the United Nations, the departure of these organizations would affect 50 percent of aid delivery in the country. In response, UN agencies and other organizations step up their aid efforts, and the United States, United Nations, and other countries ask Sudan to change its decision. ([State Department background note on Sudan](#), 8 April 2011)

June 2009

Three aid agencies are allowed back into Darfur under different names. The decision comes after efforts by the Obama administration and Special Envoy Gration to engage the regime in Khartoum. ([Financial Times](#), 15 June 2009)

	<p>The Obama administration holds a meeting in Washington of the two main parties from northern and southern Sudan in an effort to prevent a revival of conflict. The parties agree to accept binding arbitration due the following month on division of the disputed region of Abyei, a region rich in oil. (Financial Times, 25 June 2009)</p>
July 2009	<p>The Permanent Court of Arbitration rules that the Abyei Boundary Committee had gone beyond its mandate and had insufficient evidence when setting the boundaries in 2005. As a result of the new decision, areas with large oil reserves and control over the pipeline infrastructure are given to Khartoum, while large fertile areas and areas with some oil are included in Abyei. (Economist, 23 July 2009; Financial Times, 23 July 2009)</p>
October 2009	<p>President Obama unveils a new comprehensive policy towards Sudan that holds open the promise of lifting sanctions and removing the country from the State Department's State Sponsor of Terrorism list. The policy has three priorities: implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in 2005, ending the conflict in Darfur, and ensuring that Sudan does not become a safe haven for international terrorists. The policy also specifies that relations will not be normalized unless progress is made on all issues. (CRS 2011, 5)</p>
December 2009	<p>A law authorizing referenda on independence for southern Sudan, and whether residents of Abyei wish to be part of the north or the south, is passed. (Reuters, 31 May 2010; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 4 January 2011)</p>
April 2010	<p>Sudan's first national elections in 24 years are boycotted by most of the main opposition parties amid allegations that the ruling National Congress Party manipulated a national census, voter registration, and constituency boundaries. (Financial Times, 12 April, 2010)</p>
July 2010	<p>The ICC issues a second arrest warrant for President Bashir restoring three counts of genocide, following review by an appeals body. (New York Times, 13 July 2010, A4)</p>
September 2010	<p>The United States removes certain restrictions on licensing inputs for the agricultural sector and spare parts for trains. (CRS 2011, 7)</p>
October 2010	<p>The Obama administration waives sanctions against four countries, including Sudan, under the Child Soldiers Prevention Act. Southern Sudan allegedly uses child soldiers in the Sudan People's Liberation Army, but the Obama administration argues that</p>

imposing sanctions would have punished countries working with United States against al Qaeda militants, and that the United States intends to work with South Sudan to halt the use of child soldiers. ([New York Times](#), 29 October, 2011, A10)

January 2011

Southern Sudanese vote overwhelmingly (with 98.8 percent voting) in favor of secession, with the exception of southern Sudanese living in northern areas, who fear that they may have to leave after independence in July 2011. The new country will officially be called the Republic of South Sudan. Outstanding issues include how the large oil reserves in the region will be shared. Seventy-five percent of the oil reserves of Sudan are located in the south. The planned referendum to determine the status of Abyei is postponed. ([New York Times](#), 5 January, 2011, A4; [New York Times](#), 21 January, 2011, A7; [CRS 2011](#), Summary, 2; [Al Arabiya News](#), 15 February; [Government of Southern Sudan, The Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan](#), 2011)

February 2011

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton congratulates Sudan, and indicates the United States will begin the process of withdrawing Sudan's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. (State Department background note on Sudan, www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5424.htm)

Senior French and US officials agree at an African Union summit to consider supporting the deferment of war crimes and genocide charges against the Sudanese president. ([Financial Times](#), 4 February, 2011; [Financial Times](#), 7 February, 2011)

March 2011

Sixty-nine soldiers and militiamen die in fighting between southern Sudanese forces and militias in the south. The south accuses the north of arming these militias in an effort to destabilize the region before independence; the north denies arming militias. ([Financial Times](#), 18 March, 2011)

May 2011

Violence erupts in the disputed border region of Abyei, which is claimed by both northerners and southerners. Fighting prompts up to 40,000 people to flee their homes. ([Financial Times](#), 25 May, 2011)

North and south agree to create a demilitarized zone along the region's disputed border. The border is 1,240 miles long, and the zone will be 12.4 miles wide. The deal is disclosed by the African Union, and both sides remain skeptical as to how it will be implemented. ([New York Times](#), 31 May, 2011, A10)

June 2011

Fighting breaks out in southern Kordofan state, which is part of the north but is a border region where many people fought for the south during the civil war. Key issues such as clear-cut borders, citizenship rights, and how oil will be shared have not been finalized. As fighting in southern Kordofan escalates, President Obama calls for a ceasefire. According to UN officials, the fighting has caused a humanitarian crisis; ethnic killings and house to house searches by government and militia forces are reported by rights groups. ([New York Times](#), 7 June, 2011, A8; [Financial Times](#), 14 June, 2011)

Responding to the outbreak of violence in Abyei and Southern Kordofan (border regions between northern and southern Sudan), State Department spokesman Mark Toner states that “if Sudan chooses to escalate further the situation and pursue a military solution to the future status of Abyei and Southern Kordofan, the United States will not move forward on the roadmap to normalization of relations, and Sudan will face deeper international isolation.” ([US State Department Daily Press Briefing](#), 14 June, 2011)

9 July 2011

South Sudan becomes an independent country. South Sudanese President Salva Kiir is inaugurated and says that the people of South Sudan “must advance their country together, unite as countrymen first, casting aside allegiance to the dozens of tribes that reside here.” Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir attends the inaugural ceremony, stating that he respects the South’s choice to secede and calls on President Obama to “meet his promise to lift the sanctions imposed on Sudan.” ([Washington Post](#), 10 July, 2011, A8)

Goal of Senders

Secretary of State James A. Baker III

"The United States remains profoundly concerned about massive human suffering in Sudan....We call on authorities at all levels on both sides to remove remaining obstacles and do everything possible to provide emergency relief to victims caught in garrison towns and other areas of the war zone." Baker also calls for cease-fire in civil war. (*Washington Post*, 9 February 1990, A34)

US Ambassador to Sudan G. Norman Anderson

Anderson meets with General Bashir following coup deposing Mahdi, reportedly urges him to "show swift progress in resolving the six-year-old civil war, a move that could influence Washington's decision" on waiving section 513 of Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act (see "Legal Notes"). (*New York Times*, 16 July 1989, 4)

US Government

"[T]he administration is trying to maintain friendly relations while pressing the government to negotiate peace and ease delivery of famine relief....Congress has pushed the administration to consider stronger action, including withholding non-humanitarian aid, to pressure Khartoum to get food to civilians and negotiate an end to the civil war." (*Congressional Quarterly Weekly*, 13 May 1989, 1132)

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright

"The United States has imposed sweeping new economic sanctions against the Government of Sudan because of its continued sponsorship of international terrorism, its effort to destabilize neighboring countries and its abysmal record on human rights, including religious persecution." (*New York Times*, 5 November 1997, A7; USIS Washington File, 4 November 1997)

US Representative Chris Smith (R-NJ)

"Not only should we not weaken the sanctions, we should strengthen them to ensure that when Khartoum opens the new oil pipeline being built for it by western companies, it will not be able to buy an army with the power to crush the people of the south once and for all." (USIS, 27 May 1999)

US Office of Foreign Assets Control

"The Ultimate objective of sanctions is behavioral change. [...] The US Department of the Treasury has administered economic sanctions in response to [...] the Government of Sudan's support for international terrorism, efforts to destabilize neighboring governments, and perpetration and sponsorship of pervasive human rights violations in South Sudan and [...] in the Darfur region." ([OFAC Report to Congress](#), January 2009)

US Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton

"We've got to figure out some way to make it worth their while to peacefully accept an independent south, and for the south to recognize that unless they want more years of warfare and no chance to build their own new state, they've got to make some accommodations with the north as well."

(*Washington Post*, 9 September, 2010, A18)

US President, Barack Obama

If Sudan's government "acts to improve the situation on the ground and advance peace, we stand ready to work with Sudan to ensure its rightful place in the international community." (*Agence France Presse*, 1 November, 2010)

Response of Target Country

Prime Minister Sadiq Mahdi

Mahdi characterizes civil war as "a nuisance...Of course it is costing us lives. But it is like you have lost your finger. You don't die because you have lost your finger. The worst that can happen to the Sudan is a division between north and south." (*Washington Post*, 21 November 1987, A20)

Ghazi Salah al-din, close adviser to Bashir

"It is a belief that is unfortunately gaining momentum every day, that the West is a hopeless case in understanding Islam, and that these allegations [of human rights abuses and terrorism, see case 93-5] are used as a stick to whip us with." (*Christian Science Monitor*, 24 March 1993, 3)

Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail

"Sudan has succeeded in dealing with and containing the adverse effects of the embargo. . . . We will continue denouncing this unilateral resolution in all international and regional forums." (*Agence France Presse*, 4 November 1998)

Sudanese Vice President, Ali Osman Taha

"The United States has offered to lift sanctions after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is implemented. But its implementation is a commitment by us. We do not need a bonus, or sanctions, for us to implement it." (*Agence France Presse*, 4 October, 2010)

Spokesman for the Sudanese Foreign Ministry, Moawiya Osman Khalid

On the United States' decision to extend sanctions: "We reject it [...] we see no reason for the decision of the American administration which continues with its failed policy towards Sudan." The United States "has lost the chance to play a constructive role" in Sudan. (*Agence France Presse*, 2 November, 2010)

Attitude of Other Countries

Libya

As US military assistance declined after mid-1980s, Libya becomes "one of Sudan's major military patrons." In March 1989, government of Sudan signs \$250 million arms deal with Libya. (*Washington Post*, 4 March 1989, A18)

United Kingdom, Netherlands

These countries cut their aid to Sudan because of previous government's failure to end civil war. (*New York Times*, 16 July 1989, 4)

Neighboring countries

Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Egypt have become increasingly fearful of Sudanese support for armed Islamist movements. They have accused Sudan of supporting Muslim radicals intent on overthrowing their regimes. Only Kenya remains on speaking terms with the Khartoum government (*Economist*, 9 December 1995, 42; Associated Press, 22 January 1996)

Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, comments on proposed military aid for Sudan “We have close cooperation with Sudan and if we help them, no one should complain.” (Agence France Presse, 12 February 1997)

United Nations Chief, Ban Ki-Moon

“We expect the referenda to be peaceful [...] we expect both parties to accept the results, and to plan for the consequences. The Sudanese people cannot afford a resumption of conflict. We must all assist them in finding a peaceful way through one of the most important passages in their country’s history.” (Agence France Presse, 24 September, 2010)

African Union

The African Union’s Peace and Security Council “assured the Sudanese parties of Africa’s full solidarity and support and called on the international community to facilitate and support the Sudanese parties in their efforts, including by [...] removing the sanctions against Sudan.” (Agence France Presse, 1 December, 2010)

Legal Notes

Section 513 of Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act of 1989: "None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to this Act shall be obligated or expended to finance directly any assistance to any country whose duly elected Head of Government is deposed by military coup or decree...."

Executive Order, Title 31 Part 538 of the US Code of Federal Regulations

“Except for information or informational materials and donated articles intended to relieve human suffering, such as food, clothing and medicine, no goods, technology, or services may be exported from the United States to Sudan, either directly or through third countries, without a license.” (US Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control)

Executive Order 13400

Expands “the national emergency declared in Executive Order No. 13067 to block the property and interests in property of certain persons connected with the conflict in Darfur.” Targets “persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury [...] to have: constituted a threat to the peace process of Darfur; be responsible for heinous conduct with respect to human life; have supplied, sold or transferred arms or any related material [...] to the warring parties in Darfur.” (“Effectiveness of US Economic Sanctions with Respect to Sudan,” US Office of Foreign Assets Control, January 2009; “Sudan,” US Office of Foreign Assets Control, 25 July, 2008)

Executive Order 13412

Takes “additional steps to address the continued violence in Darfur created by the policies and actions of the Government of Sudan. The Executive Order continues the countrywide blocking of the Government of Sudan imposed by EO 13067, but excludes the regional Government of Southern Sudan from the definition of the Government of Sudan, thereby allowing most transactions with the Government of Southern Sudan.” (“Sudan,” US Office of Foreign Assets Control, 25 July, 2008)

Economic Impact

Observed Economic Statistics

In 1988, per capita income was \$440 for Sudan as a whole, and \$150 for southern part of country. Inflation was about 85 percent in 1989. (*National Journal*, 10 December 1988, 3130; *Washington Post*, 1 July 1989, A31)

Between 1975 and 1985 Sudan received \$1.6 billion in economic aid from the United States, nearly two-thirds of US military aid for sub-Saharan Africa. US military aid to Sudan has decreased from high of \$101.2 million in 1982 to \$900,000 in 1989. Administration officials attribute cuts to budget austerity rather than change in policy. (*Washington Post*, 4 March 1989, A18; 24 May 1990, A48; *Congressional Quarterly Weekly*, 13 May 1989, 1133)

Sudan receives \$25.7 million in military aid in fiscal year 1988, \$4.4 million in fiscal year 1989 from previous foreign military sales (FMS) grants. Another \$9.2 million in prior-year FMS grants was suspended because Sudan is in arrears on US loans. Since February 1988 \$75 million has been spent for famine relief. (*Congressional Quarterly Weekly*, 13 May 1989, 1133)

Sudan has incurred foreign debt of over \$10 billion. Civil war is estimated to cost more than \$1 million a day. (*Washington Post*, 24 May 1990, A48)

EC [nonhumanitarian] aid to Sudan was cut in 1990. To date, Brussels has halted 300 million ecu (\$345 million) in grants, which include sums for development projects and for losses on commodity exports. (Inter Press Service, 19 January 1994)

International aid to Sudan was \$650 million before the 1989 coup, while in 1993-94 it was only \$180 million. (Agence France Presse, 6 March 1996)

Iran reportedly financed Sudan’s 1993 purchase of 20 Chinese ground-attack aircraft. Iran apparently provides Khartoum aid for arms purchases in exchange for use of Sudan’s marine bases. (*Europa World Yearbook 1997*, 3065)

The war is also the main reason for Sudan’s economic mess. It is true that inflation, now about 70 percent, is better than last year’s 200 percent. But the government’s finances are a disaster area; the public debt, at \$16 billion-plus, is more than twice the country’s annual GDP. The war is by now an impossible extra burden. (*Economist*, 24 June 1995, 21)

Since the United States has only \$70 million in annual trade with the Sudan, including \$50 million in US exports, US officials concede that the sanctions are “more a statement of principle than anything else.” (*New York Times*, 5 November 1997, A7)

As of January 1998, net blocked Sudanese assets in the US amount to \$18.9 million. (Office of Foreign Assets Control, *Terrorist Assets Report*, January 1998, 6)

The withdrawal of Coca Cola is one of the most spectacular spinoffs of the embargo imposed by Washington.... Local business has [also] reportedly complained about shortages of spare parts. And some consumer goods, such as computers, have become scarcer. Companies that used to import computers from [the] United States are now closing their doors. (Inter Press Service, 9 April 1988)

In the period of May 2007 through May 2008, OFAC blocked 65 transactions totaling over \$1,117,000, and US banks rejected 576 such transactions, resulting in a disruption of at \$133.2 million in business for Sudan. Blockings are transactions in which the Government of Sudan has an interest. (“Effectiveness of US Economic Sanctions with Respect to Sudan,” US Office of Foreign Assets Control, January 2009)

“US sanctions on Sudan have raised the cost of doing business for Sudan. The Government of Sudan has endeavored to navigate around US efforts to isolate Sudan from the US and international financial systems, but [...] without specific authorization from OFAC, Sudan is unable to use the US banking system, limiting Sudan’s access to US dollars. Sanctions also have impeded Sudan’s access to international financial markets and institutions.[...] Although some banks have made limited exceptions to this new policy, others have told their Sudanese customers that they are closing their accounts and refusing to conduct any new business involving Sudan.” (“Effectiveness of US Economic Sanctions with Respect to Sudan,” US Office of Foreign Assets Control, January 2009)

“US sanctions against Sudan also appear to be impeding moves by Sudan-owned entities to raise revenue abroad. Giad Motor Industry Co. Ltd., a state-owned domestic car and truck maker in Sudan, was among the thirty-one Sudanese companies designated in May 2007 for its assistance in providing armored vehicles to the GOS for military operations in Darfur. Approximately one year later, Giad Motor prepared to launch its initial public offering on the Dubai stock market. Brokers refused to participate in Giad Motor’s deal on the Dubai exchange because of the designation and the company’s connection to the Sudanese military.” (“Effectiveness of US Economic Sanctions with Respect to Sudan,” US Office of Foreign Assets Control, January 2009)

Sudan: Foreign trade, 1990-2010 (millions of dollars)

Year	Exports		Imports	
	Total	To US	Total	From US
1990	515	14	1,305	47
1991	366	15	1,401	102
1992	320	11	1,261	58
1993	352	11	1,153	58
1994	474	33	1,152	60
1995	535	21	1,263	48
1996	496	18	1,298	55
1997	510	12	1,511	41
1998	542	3	1,605	7
1999	706	0	1,577	8
2000	1,625	2	1,479	18
2001	1,755	3	1,894	19
2002	1,887	1	2,196	12
2003	2,609	7	2,723	17
2004	3,774	3	4,086	34
2005	4,284	12	6,690	130
2006	5,567	5	8,074	104
2007	8,867	9	8,742	154
2008	12,069	5	10,095	158
2009	7,033	10	8,846	87
2010	8,863	8	9,893	127

Source: IMF *Direction of Trade Statistics* CD, March 2011.

Note: Years 2008 to 2010 are estimates, as calculated by the IMF.

Sudan: Economic aid, net disbursements, 1986-2005 (millions of dollars)

	United States	United Kingdom	Netherlands	Other bilateral	EC	Multilateral IFIs	Total
1986	148.0	37.5	52.5	421.3	62.1	205.1	1128.6
1987	103.0	31.3	58.9	457.2	86.2	199.3	944.8
1988	109.0	45.2	67.0	382.0	56.3	276.5	937.9
1989	110.0	50.8	57.0	242.9	67.9	244.3	772.9
1990	143.0	37.2	62.5	185.0	87.6	311.3	826.6
1991	85.0	47.5	46.3	205.7	142.9	353.5	880.9
1992	11.0	12.9	32.2	151.2	80.6	259.4	547.4
1993	21.0	15.0	35.3	94.6	33.4	258.6	457.9
1994	32.0	25.7	29.1	87.3	33.1	205.3	412.5
1995	8.0	10.9	31.4	80.4	21.7	83.4	235.8
1996	10.0	9.6	22.1	76.4	23.5	88.7	230.3
1997	17.0	9.9	20.5	38.4	21.2	31.2	138.5
1998	13.2	31.0	26.7	79.3	16.8	41.7	209.4
1999	71.5	13.2	15.3	58.5	19.6	38.6	243.0
2000	5.2	5.7	15.3	64.1	13.9	21.8	225.4
2001	17.5	9.9	23.6	56.6	21.3	46.7	185.4
2002	119.6	13.5	22.7	76.5	17.0	50.5	350.9
2003	175.4	33.0	21.0	102.6	247.1	34.6	616.6
2004	377.6	116.6	097.6	250.3	68.9	43.5	991.8
2005	771.5	196.5	164.8	n.a	212.8	n.a.	1828.6

Source: OECD, *Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients*, various editions.

Sudan: US economic and military aid, obligations, and loan authorizations, 1986-2009
(millions of dollars)

Year	Economic	Military*	Total
1986	121.2	17	138.3
1987	96.6	6	102.6
1988	63.2	0.9	64.1
1989	56.8	0.9	57.7
1990	21.2	-	21.2
1991	50.1	-	50.1
1992	35.7	-	35.7
1993	53.9	-	53.9
1994	66.5	-	66.5
1995	30.1	-	30.1
1996	24.4	-	24.4
1997	27.8	-	27.8
1998	65.9	-	65.9
1999	92.8	-	92.8
2000	50.9	-	50.9
2001	68.7	-	68.7
2002	120.9	-	120.9
2003	186.0	-	186.0
2004	474.1	5	479.1
2005	885.2	173.9	1,059.1
2006	758.3	160.1	918.4
2007	810.1	384.4	1,194.5
2008	996.9	425.7	1,422.6
2009	1,174.1	38.7	1,212.8

Source: US Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, USAID Foreign Assistance Database (FADB, FY2001 to FY2009, <http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov>).

* US military aid was to build the capacity of the army in Southern Sudan.

Calculated economic impact

Phase I: (1989–)

Reduction in US military and economic aid, welfare cost estimated as 90% of reduction in average annual flows in 1992–1996 compared with 1986-89 \$43.7 million

Reduction in other bilateral economic aid, welfare cost estimated as 90% of reduction in aid from 1992-96 annual average levels compared with 1986-89. \$344.8 million

Annual total (1989–) \$388.5 million

Phase II: (1993–)

Prohibition of financial transactions with Government of Sudan negligible

Loss of trade with United States, welfare cost estimated as 30 percent of average annual value of trade, 1990-2010 \$22.1 million

Freeze of Sudanese assets; welfare cost estimated as 10 percent of assets frozen in the United States, 2000-2008 \$85 million

Annual total (1993–) \$107.1 million

Average annual total (1989–) \$247.8 million

Relative magnitudes

Gross indicators of Sudan's economy

Sudanese GDP (2011) \$68.4 billion

Sudanese population (2011) 45 million

Annual effect on sanctions related to gross indicators

Percentage of GNP 3.7

Per capita \$17.7

Sudan's trade with United States as percentage of total trade

Exports (2010) 0.1

Imports (2010) 1.3

Ratio of US GNP (2010: \$14,690 billion) to Sudanese GDP 215

Assessment

Arthur S. Banks, Alan J. Day, and Thomas C. Mueller

“Due in part to the weakness of opposition political forces, the administration has proved more resilient than anticipated, its Islamization campaign proceeding steadily in the north despite continued concern among non-Muslims about the imposition of fundamentalist measures.” (Banks, Day, and Muller 1997, 796)

Amnesty International

“Sudanese from virtually all sectors of society, from northern Sudan, the war-torn south and the Nuba mountains, suffered human rights violations as the authorities continued to suppress political opposition.... Serious human rights abuses were committed by all sides in continuing fighting.” (Amnesty International 1997)

Southern Faction Chief Riek Machar

“The southern problem has been cracked with the signing of the peace agreement. Now, if the Americans changed their policy of opposition to the Sudanese government...the SPLA would have no choice but to come to terms with the government.” (*Financial Times*, 8 September 1998, 7)

Authors' Summary

Overall assessment

- Policy result, scaled from 1 (failed) to 4 (success) 2
- Sanctions contribution, scaled from 1 (negative) to 4 (significant) 2
- Success score (policy result times sanctions contribution) scaled from 1 (outright failure) to 16 (significant success) 4

Political and economic variables

- Companion policies: J (covert), Q (quasi-military), R (regular military) —
- International cooperation with sender, scaled from 1 (none) to 4 (significant) 3
- International assistance to target: A (if present) —
- Cooperating international organizations EC
- Sanction period (years) 22+
- Economic health and political stability of target, scaled from 1 (distressed) to 3 (strong) 1
- Presanction relations between sender and target, scaled from 1 (antagonistic) to 3 (cordial) 3
- Regime type of target, scaled from 1 (authoritarian) to 3 (democratic) 1
- Type of sanction: X (export), M (import), F (financial), Z (asset freeze) F
- Cost to sender, scaled from 1 (net gain) to 4 (major loss) 1

Authors' Comments

While a peace agreement was reached ending the Civil War between northern and southern Sudan, allowing the south to become independent, conflict and allegations of atrocities in some areas along the new border flared up in Summer 2011. The conflict in Darfur, while less severe, has also not been resolved and genuine moves toward democracy remain elusive. In addition, the terrorism sanctions have become enmeshed with the concerns over human rights and, as of Summer 2011, the promised removal of Sudan from the list of state sponsors of terrorism had not happened because of the renewed violence.

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